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As philosophers have devoted more attention to
problems in philosophical psychology and the philosophy
of action, the concept of choice has been given closer
scrutiny.
The debate surrounding the concept of choice is
focused on two main areas. First, is choosing funda-
mentally a volition, a decision, or an action? The
second area concerns the conditions under which an
agent is said to choose. Issues raised here are the
role and status of alternatives, the nature and role
of deliberation, the concept of commitment, the role
of intention, and the role of purposes. For some
of these the question is two-fold. Are they necessary
conditions of choice? And if so, what conception of
them is adequate for the concept of choice?
In chapters 2 through 7 I examine various theories,
grouped by type according to what is considered the
fundamental nature of choosing. In each chapter I
point out difficulties with the theories being consid-
ered and attempt to remedy them. A number of issues,
however, are relevant to more than one of these chapters.
*
1
2And some of them require more extensive consideration.
Chapter 8 deals with these issues. Drawing on insights
gained in previous chapters, I present a theory of
choice in chapter 9*
In presenting formal statements of these theories
I have had to quantify over variables that might not
refer to an existing object. An agent might believe
he has two alternatives but one of them could be
illusory, such as MacBeth' s dagger. Likewise, when
an agent is considering two alternative courses of
action that he might follow, he might believe he is
capable of performing an action that logically impossible
for him to perform.
Some readers might be disturbed to see such
entities referred to by variables that are bound by
quantifiers. For those so disturbed I suggest that
they read these quantifiers substitutionally
.
Chapter 2
CHOOSING AS A VOLITION
If any theory of choice may be called traditional,
it is the view that choosing is a volition. 0. S.
Franks cites Aristotle as holding that
• • • ohe act of choice is that act which comes
after deliberation about what is to be done,
and initiates action. First there is a desire,
then deliberation as to how best to accomplish
what is desired, then comes action. Choice is
the act which begins the doing of the action.
It is well known that Aristotle like other
Greek philosophers failed to recognize that
there was such a thing as will. Yet Aristotle
was clearly feeling his way in his account
of action towards the notion of will; in fact,
his account needs to be supplemented merely
by addition. Choice is indeed the act which
begins the doing of the action, but it is that
because every act of choice is an act of will,
a volition. In this way it is easy to see where
is the place of choice in moral action; it is,
as the decisive act of will, the beginning of any
3
4moral action, preceded perhaps by preliminary
thinking and deliberation, and also by desire,
but not, like them, a preliminary to action:
choice is the first event in that causally
connected series of events which we call a moral
action, the first member of the action itself. 1
The theory that Franks has outlined in this
passage clearly casts choosing as an act that is the
Initial and initiating portion of a moral action. A
moral action is a complex series of events the first
of which is this act of choice.
Choosing is a simple act of will, or a volition,
and it is preceded by a desire and deliberation. What
is the object of such a choice? Franks notes that
Aristotle employed, though did not explicitly acknowl-
edge, a distinction between choice of ends and choice
of means, and held that
...choice is of means only, never of ends, the
later reducing in his opinion to one, the sole
end of all human action, and being in consequence
fixed for all men and for any man at all times.
The Aristotelian doctrine of choice is of the
choice of means to a fixed end. 2
2-0. S. Franks, "Choice", Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society
.
N.S., Vol. XXXIV, 1933-34, P- 271.
2lbid., p. 271
5The object of an agent's choice is a means to
achieve an end, or a means to satisfy a desire. Appar-
ently the object of choice should then be a course of
action. Franks refers to Aristotle's view that the
ends of human action collapse into a single fixed end
for all men at all times. And he concludes that that
fixed end is the end that all choices of men are
Intended to fulfill.
This view requires further analysis and additional
comments, but we ill defer these until we have clarified
the position expressed in these passages. Then we will
present a formal statement of the theory and evaluate it.
The conception of moral action underlying this
theory of choice has this form:
For any agent S, and any action X, X is a moral
action of S's if and only if there is a Y such
that: (l) Y is an act of choice, a volition;
(2) X is a causally connected series of events;
and (3) Y is the first event in X.
In the passages cited above, the volition was designated
"...the first member of the action itself." I did not
use the term "member" above because it is not clear how
Franks is using it. If he understands an action to be
an ordered set of events, then the volition could be
considered the first member. But he does not employ
set theoretical terminology elsewhere, so we will not
6use the term "member" to express Y's realtion to X.
Intuitively, the thrust of this theory is that,
under certain conditions, a person chooses to perform
an action W if and only if he has a volition V that is
the first event in the causally connected series of
events that constitutes W. Let us express it more
formally as (Tl).
(Tl) For any person S and any action W, S chooses
to perform W if and only if there is a B
and there is a V such that:
(1) B is the end of S and all men;
(2) S deliberates on how to realize B;
(3) W is a causally connected series of events
( 4 ) W is a means of realizing B;
( 5 ) W is a moral action;
( 6 ) V is a volition of S*s; and
( 7 ) V is the first event in W.
Note that S chooses to perform W, and his choosing
is part of his performance of W. That is, he chooses tc
perform W by, among other things, beginning the doing of
W. Again we did not use the term "member" in clause ( 4 )
to avoid confusion.
Our formulation of (Tl) does not include any
statement that S actually performs W. Must he? Can S
have the volition V and not perform W? Would V still be
a volition? What is the realtion between the volition
?and the rest of the action? The only indication we get
from these passages is that the volition "...begins the
doing of the action." We also know that the volition
is causally related to the other events that constitute
the action.
Let us return to the end of one's choice. Aristotle
might be right. in his contention that there is only one
ultimate fixed end of human action. But this assertion
does not warrant the conclusion that every instance of
choosing is a choice of means to that single end. If we
collapse all the ends or purposes of mankind into a
single end, and if we insist that every choice is a
choice of means to that end, we overlook the fact that
many actions chosen as means also serve as ends. Some-
times the supposed and stated purposes of some agents
are sufficiently transparent that others can see that
they are means to a further end. But not all of our
choices and purposes are that transparent, even to
ourselves. Sometimes we seek to fulfill a purpose that
we want to realize in and of itself. Yet that purpose
would not necessarily qualify as a candidate for
Aristotle's single fixed purpose for all mankind.
One might, for example, desire to become a surgeon.
As a means to reallxe that desire he chooses to attend
medical school. But to attend medical school he must
complete an undergraduate degree. And to complete an
8undergraduate degree he must choose to attend a college,
choose to take the right courses, etc. On the view
advanced in this theory, choosing to take the right
courses is a means to completing the undergraduate de-
gree, which, in turn, is a means to attending a medical
school, which is a means to become a surgeon.
On the view advanced in this theory, the agent*
s
taking the right courses is a means to his becoming a
surgeon. The means-end relation is held to be transitive.
If A is a means to B, and B is a means to C, then A is a
means to C. But must we accept this transitivity of
the means-end relationship? And must we hold that the
final end of each person is the same?
It is questionable that all men are working
toward the same end* We might be able to generalize
the statement of the end to, say, self-fulfillment, to
make it applicable to all, but then it would be triv-
ially true. The agreement would be on the use of the
term "self-fulfillment”, but not on its meaning. The
price paid to achieve unanimity on the term could be to
give the terra a sufficiently general meaning as to allow
such a wide variety of conditions to satisfy it that
it would lack distinctive meaning.
If we assume that all men are working toward
only one overall goal, we shall also fall to recognize
that some of our goals are net seen as means to higher
9ends. Consider the would-be surgeon again. While one
might argue that being a surgeon is a means to self-
fulfillment to him, he could have decided to be a
surgeon just because he wants to be a surgeon. Then
he would not have chosen it as a means to any other end.
The theory has another fault. Suppose that the
right hand side of the definition is fulfilled, but in
that state of affairs in which it was fulfilled there was
only one possible means of achieving the end. Our agent
executed the action, but we could hardly say that he
chose that particular means of realizing the end. If he
did any choosing at all in that situation, he chose to
realize the end. So we have a counterexample to this
theory, showing that the definition is too broad. It
allows actions to be called choices when they are not
choices, because it makes no provision for the require-
ment that the agent chooses among alternatives.
Several points emerge from our discussion. We
need a clause providing for alternatives for the agent.
But these alternatives need not be truly means to reali-
zing his end. Even the one he chooses need not be a
means to that end. All he need do is to believe that
they are means to his end.
The criticism raised against (Tl) thus far call
for a modification like (Tla).
10
(Tla) For any person S and any action V, S chooses
to perform W if and only if there is a B
and there is a V and there is a Y such that:
(1) B is an end of S's;
(2) S deliberates on how to realize B;
(3) S believes W and Y are his alternative
means to realize B;
(4 ) V is a volition of S’s;
(5) V is the first event in W;
(6) W is a causally connected series of events;
(7) W is a moral action.
Choosing, according to this theory, is an integral
part of a moral action. It is the initial and initiating
act that is the first event in a causally connected
series of events that is called a moral action. Appar-
ently every moral action involves a choice. But surely
wre cannot accept this identification of choosing and
moral action.
Not all instances of choosing are moral actions.
Person S might have a tray of brownies presented to
him. He considers talcing just brownie A and taking
just brownie B. He chooses to take just brownie A.
Is this choosing a moral action? Suppose the tray is
sufficiently full so that there is plenty for everyone.
Then S is not depriving anyone of a brownie. So his
taking Just brownie A is not immoral. Perhaps one
and
11
who defends (Tla) would maintain that S's not taking
all of the brownies was moral because by not doing so
he did not prevent the others from enjoying their share.
But S did not chooee to not take all of the brownies.
He chose to take Just brownie A.
S's reasons for taking Just brownie A might include
his desire to be sociable, his desire to satisfy his
hunger, or his desire to sample this type of brownie.
But none of these reasons would make his choosing a
moral action.
So it is not all clear that every case of choosing
is a moral action. Instead of merely asserting this
identification he should have argued for it.
Looking at the theory from the other side, can we
find a counterexample in which a moral action involves
no choice? What is a moral action? We need not work
out a rigorous formal statement here, so we shall
speak Just roughly. Isn't a moral action one for which
we are held responsible? Isn't a moral action one
which is called 'good' or 'bad' — though we would
expect some actions such as 'good shot' from the
category of moral actions?
Let us focus on this aspect of responsibility.
Aren't there actions for which we are held responsible
yet no act of choosing was involved? On the basis of
the original statement of (Tl), there might not be. But
12
we found that vre had to modify (Tl), specifically to
Include the condition that the agent believe that
epecific possible courses of action are his alternatives.
Suppose the agent is not aware of any alternatives, is
not under any pressure to execute the action in question,
but Just does it. We would hold him responsible, but
no act of choosing was involved.
One who holds (Tla) might object to this counter-
example on the basis that every action involved a
volition or act of will, and that an act of choosing is
an act of will, a volition. But does this mean that
every act of will, or volition, if an act of choosing?
I doubt that he could wish to hold that that is the
case.
There is a further problem that this theory must
confront. Choosing is held to be the initial event
in a causally connected series of events that is a
moral action; and the act of choice is an act of will
or volition. Suppose one were to execute this act of
choosing, the act of will or volition, but that at some
point along this causally connected series of events,
the series is broken or blocked. We might ask whether
this is still a moral action and whether our agent can
really be said to have chosen. We could construct many
counterexamples in which one could choose the means to
achieve his end and yet not realize that end. Can he
13
be said to have chosen?
Two different questions are raised here: First,
must the conpleted action comprised of the choosing and
carrying out of the means result in the achievement of
the end desired? The way I have stated it reveals the
answer, which is "No." The question was essentially
whether the achievement of the end was an integral
part of the completed action, or whether one could
complete the action but fail to achieve the goal.
Neither (Tl) nor (Tla) contains a provision that would
try to guarantee satisfaction of one's puroose or goal,
nor any statement at all about the relation between
the act of choosing, the carrying out of the means
and the achievement of the goal. This point we will
treat below. But first let us finish with the question
at hand. One quick illustration will shoxtf that one
can chooGe means to achieve a goal and carry them out
and yet not achieve it. Suppose I am hungry and I
choose a hamburger, vis-a-vis a hotdog, and I eat the
hamburger. I may still be hungry. Perhaps two or
three hamburgers are needed. So achievement of one's
purpose or goal or end is not one of the required
events in that causally connected series of events
that comprises an action in which one can be said
to have chosen.
The second question is closely related to the
14
firet. If this causally connected series of events
ie broken or blocked, did our agent still choose?
Both this Question and the previous one are concerned
with what constitutes the fundamental or minimal unit
of action that can be termed a choice. And both are
raising the point of whether the series of events which
constitutes this unit can be broken or blocked, and
if so, where, without forcing us to deny that the
agent chose.
The issue is complicated by the approach of this
theory which places the act of choice as an integral
part, though only one part, of an action. And it is
not clear whether it requires that the action be com-
pleted or not. Our formal statement of (Tl) would
require that the action be completed to satisfy the
right hand side of the definition.
One way around this difficulty would be to reduce
the size of an action unit to the minimum. Suppose
I sat down in a restaurant, scanned the menu, and chose
a hamburger as a means to satisfy my hunger. The
waitress came to take my order and I ordered a hamburger.
But she replied that they were all out of hamburger,
and, not being concerned with philosophical distinc-
tions, she added that I would have to choose something
else; I would have to choose again.
If we cast as the action unit my choosing a hamburg,
my ordering a hamburger, and my eating a hamburger,
15
the action 1 b incomplete, thwarted because the supply
Is exhausted. But if we were to restate my original
purpose of satisfying my hunger as eating a hamburger
(that is, what had been my means is now my purpose) and
cast my ordering of a hamburger as the means I execute
to achieve my end of eating a hamburger, we would have
an action that would be complete and would satisfy
our theory. Note, though, that the theory satisfied
would be the theory as modified, (Tla) and not (Tl),
for unless we denied the collapsing of ends into one
final end, the string of causally connected events
would be broken when the waitress blocked my eating
of the hamburger by telling me that they had none left.
I might have then been able to have satisfied my hunger
with a hotdog, but I could not have been said to have
chosen a hamburger.
But will this example really satisfy our theory?
What other means did our agent consider? Going out into
the restaurant kitchen and cooking it himself? Stealing
it off the waitress' tray as she went by to serve another
customer? Within the restaurant he may have considered
no other options. But we could cast his alternatives
as going to a restaurant and ordering a hamburger,
or going home and cooking a hamburger. This may seem
minor and peripheral to our central concerns, but I
point out these problems for cne like these involving
16
the description of actions and the individuation of
events and means will arise every time we attempt to
portray choosing as an action or as part of an action.
So far we have said little about choosing being
a volition. Above we pointed out that some volitions
are not choices. Is every choice a volition?
A volition is the first event in an action, ac-
cording to this theory. Is every choice the first
event of an action? Suppose an agent chooses to perform
A if P obtains. If P never obtains, the agent will
never perform A. There is no action, and thus no
volition; but there is a choice.
Franks states that Aristotle did not employ
volition but only because the Greeks had not developed
it. Yet he adds it because he thinks it will complete
Aristotle's theory as he states it.
Is Franks' statement of Aristotle's theory accur-
ate? There are several passages from the Nicomachean
Ethics we should examine.
It seems to be voluntary, but not all that is
voluntary to be an object of choice. Is it, then,
what has been decided on by previous deliberation?
At any rate choice involves a rational principle
and thought. 1112al3-17
...in general, choice seems to r&ate to the
things that are in our power. llirfc>29
17
We choose what ve best know to be good. 1112a7
The same thing is deliberated upon and is chosen,
except that the object of choice is already de-
terminate, since it is that which has been decided
upon as a result of deliberation that is the object
of choice. For everyone ceases to inquire how he
is to act when he has brought the moving principle
back to himself and to the ruling part of himself;
for this what chooses. .. .The object of choice
being one of the things in our own power which
is desired after deliberation, choice will be
deliberate desire of things in our own power;
for when we have decided as a result of delibera-
tion, we desire in accordance with our deliberation.
3
One important difference between the theory sketched
here and that outlined by Franks is the emphasis on
deliberation. Franks mentions deliberation as a prelim-
inary to choosing. But he does not accord it the
postion of importance it has in the passages just
cited. And he does not spell out the connection between
the agents deliberation and his act of will.
On the theory outlined by Franks it would be
possible for an agent to deliberate, to prefer one
3Arletotle, Nlchomnchcan Ethics . Richard McKeon (ed.).
The Basic Works of Aristotle (Wew York: Random
House, 1941 )• 1113a3-l4
18
alternative, and to follow another course of action.
Or, the agent might happen to follow that course of
action he prefers, but Just by chance.
We might think it unusual for an agent to prefer
one course of action, yet follow another. If one
chooses A (rather than B), we might want to infer that
he prefers A to B. We are certainly warranted in
inferring that it is not the case that he prefers
B to A. But vre should note that a sinrole preference
of A as opposed to B is not sufficient grounds for a
theory of choice. One might prefer A to B but
choose neither.
The word 'deliberate' is being used in two ways
here. We are using it first in the sense of 'intentional'
to shov; that the agent Just did not happen to do
something accidently. To this Franks might reply that
the act of will required by (Tl) insures that the
action is intentional. But what connection, then,
is there between the fact that S deliberates and the
fact that S chooses x? Making S's choosing of x
Intentional will not establish this connection. This
is a question we shall deal with later.
The other sense in which 'deliberate' is used
here is as a verb, and this is the second point that
emerges from this illustration. For Aristotle the
process of choosing begins with a desire. Then the
19
agent is confronted with a set of alternatives that
will serve as a means to satisfy this desire or achieve
this goal. He then deliberates about these alternatives
and decides upon one of them. It is this one that is
the object of his choice.
What is Aristotle's theory of choice?/ Does he
hold that choosing is a volition, and act of will?
There is some support for this view in the passages
quoted above. For Aristotle it is the "moving principle"
in a person that does the deliberating, the choosing
and the desiring. And while, as Franks says, he does
not use the term 'will', we could easily add this to
his account and produce the basis for a theory of
choice as an act of will.
The deliberation factor gives this view a different
complexion from that of (Tl), however.
The object of choice being one of the things in
our power which is desired after deliberation,
choice will be deliberate desire of things in our
own power; for when we have decided as a result
of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our
deliberation.^
At the very minimum, deliberation is a preliminary to
any act of choice. If we read Aristotle this way, we





epea^s of a "moving principle", which Franks evidently
considers an analog of the will. This 'moving principle'
does the deliberating and does the choosing.
Is the deliberation part of the choosing? The
passage quoted directly above (lll3al 2-14 ) i 8 vague on
this point. Aristotle strongly emphasizes that the
object of choice is decided upon through deliberation
and is desired after deliberation. If the deliberation
is not part of the choosing, we have a theory of choice
that is roughly of this form.
(T2) S chooses X-df (l) x is within S's power,
(2) S has deliberated on x,
(3) S has decided upon x, and
(4 ) S deliberately desires x.
On the other hand, if we take the last oortlon of
1113 al 2-l4 , "...for when we have decided as a result
of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our delib-
c^&tion
,
as an explanation of why choice is "deliberate
desire of things in our own power"
,
or was what it means
for choice to be deliberate desire, then we have a
theory that is roughly like (T3).
(T3) S chooses x-df (l) x is within S's power,
(2) S deliberates on x
( 3 ) S decides upon x, and
(4) S deliberately desires x.
As noted above, the element of deliberation, which
is emphasized in (T2) and (T3), is absent from (Tl).
21
But in spite of the fact that (T2) and (T3) share this
emphasis, (T2) is closer to (Tl) than (T3), for only
(T3) claims that deliberating and deciding are port of
the act of choosing. (Tl) and (T2) can be considered
very generally as theories that view choice as volition
or as an act of will. But (T3) casts choice as delib-
erating, deciding, and willing.
This difference between (T2) and (T3) is important
for later theories of choice. We will find that some
later theorists, although unwilling to hold that choosing
is a volition, will hold that choosing is an action,
the carrying out of the means cited in (Tl) and the
acquisition or achievement of that which is desired
in (T2) and (T3). Others will take the emphasis on
deliberation as their touchstone and claim that choosing
is basically deliberating and deciding.
How well does (T2) stand up against some of the
objections we brought to bear against (Tl)?. The formu-
lation of (T2) contains no clause that would affirm the
collapsing of ends into one overall, general end, but
that is the case because we based (T2) on just a short
passage. Aristotle does affirm in a later passage 4*
(*1113b3-5) that it is the means we deliberate about
and choose, and not ends. All choosing for him is goal-
directed, wish-satisfying, purposeful. We have an end,
a goal, that we wish for, or desire. This desire
22
motivates us to seek a means to satisfy that desire
or achieve that end. And it is the means that we
deliberate about and decide upon and choose. So (T2),
as an expression of Aristotle's theory of choice, is
inadequate. But adding a clause that would express
this dimension of Aristotle's view would raise some of
the same objections against (T2) that we raised against
(Tl). So a completed version of (T2) would have to be
modified, as (Tl) was, to express the point that while
we may choose a particular course of action or object
as a means to another end, the object of our choice
may be sometimes chosen, in part, as an end in itself.
Our statement of (T2) fares no better than (Tl)
when we raise the question of alternatives. No direct
statement concerning alternatives appears in ( T2 )
.
The emphasis on prior deliberation and decision might
mean for some that the agent had considered other
courses of action. But these are not specified. It
is possible for a person to be faced with a situation
in which he correctly believes that he has only one
course of action. He can consider that course of
action. He can decide upon it, and he can deliberately
desire it. But since he never considered or even
believed he had an alternative, we cannot say that he
chose. Both (T2) and (T3) make clause (l) too strong
by no placing this condition in a belief context.
23
Does every case of choosing initiate a moral action
for (T2)? Again, there is no explicit reference to
moral action in our formulation of (T2), nor is there
any mention of it in the passages on which it is based.
In Book III of De Anlma
. Aristotle speaks of
desire as producing movement, and says that sometimes
desire is right and sometimes it is not right. But we
cannot take this point as grounds for holding that every
movement produced by a desire is a moral action, for at
points it is not clear whether Aristotle is distinguishing
mere bodily movement from behavior. Desire apparently
can produce movement that is not behavior, such as
instinctive responses.
But (T2) has desire qualified by the term ‘deliberate 1 .
Would this restriction yield the result that very action
produced by deliberate desire is a moral action?
Aristotle writes that "we choose what we best know to
be good." 5 And "Hence it is always the object of desire
which produces movement, but this is either the good
or the apparent good; not every good but the practicable
good. And it is that which can also be otherwise that
is practicable."^ "Every desire too is for the sake of




^Aristotle, De Anlma, tr. by D. W. Hamlyn (London:
Oxford, 19^8 ) , 433&27-30.
Zk
point for the practical intellect, and the final etep
ie the starting-point of action. "7
These passages to do help to clear up our confusion.
At one point the object of desire is the end (i.e., the
starting-point for the practical intellect); at another
it is the means, that which is the object of choice.
Since it is not clear whether Aristotle holds that de-
liberate desire will issue in a moral action, let us
not claim that for him every case of choosing is a part
of a moral action.
Our formulation of (T3) is based on an alternate
reading of the same passages upon which (T2) is based.
As noted above, the major difference between the two
theories is that for (T2) deliberation and deciding
takes place before the choosing, and in (T3
)
the delib-
eration and the deciding are integral parts of the
choosing. But, as major as this difference is, (T3)
will fare almost exactly as (T2) when confronted with the
objections raised against (Tl).
(Tl), (T2 ), and (T3) share the central property of
viewing choosing as a volition or as some sort of mental
or psychological impetus to action. On (Tl), the act
of choosing is the first event in a causally connected
series of events that constitutes an action. On (T2)




The last, and perhaps the most crucial question
ve must raise against these theories is ’Is choosing
ever a volition?* According to (Tl), if one has satis-
fied all of the other conditions, but fails to complete
the causally connected series of events that constitute
that action, the agent has not chosen. But what then
is the relationship between the act of choosing, which
is the first event in this causally connected series
of events, and the carrying out of the means, which is
the object of choice and another event in this series?
Isn’t this connection contingent? And wouldn’t it be
possible then to prevent the means from being carried
out and yet have all of the other conditions fulfilled?
But on (Tl) our agent would not have chosen those means.
We noted above, when making the point that a set
of alternatives is required for us to be able to say that
a person has made a choice, that all ve need is to have
the agent believe he has these alternatives open to him.
Apparently (Tl) would then require us to say that if
an agent had three alternatives he believed available to
him, A, B, and C, one of them, the very one he chooses,
must be real , must be open. Note that I did not say that
the agent must know that the one he chooses is really
open to him.
Suppose this agent believed that he had these three
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alternatives, A, B, and C, as possible routes in a maze
he was to run. And suppose that C is the route that will
bring him to the finish. Now suppose he decides to take
A. Can we say that he chose A? He would sey that he had.
He would try it out, return, and say that if he wanted
to reach the finish he would have to choose again.
This illustration shows that we could at least
try to choose something that is not a means. We would
it a bad choice, because it would not serve as a
means to the desired goal. But we would still call it
a choice.
An advocate of (Tl) might argue that A was not a
real alternative in the first place, that only if he had
chosen C could we be able to say that he had chosen.
But that response is not satisfying. It is like spying
that under one of three cups I have hidden a oenny. But
when you choose first one, then the other, of the two that
are not covering the penny, I say that you have not
chosen at all until you have chosen the correct one.
If we were to function on a principle like this, any
one of us could break the bank in ary gambling casino on
any given night.
Perhaps the point I am trying to make is better
illustrated by the following story. Suppose you are
visiting me and I ask you if you would like to have some-
thing to drink. You reply affirmatively and ask me
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what I have. I reply that I have root beer, coke, and
ginger ale; and I know that I have themk for I have Just
checked. You ask for root beer. But as I am going to
the kitchen to get you some root beer, my SOn opens the
refrigerator and takes the last one. I get there too
late to stop him, I return to you and tell you what
happened and tell you to choose again.
Did you choose the first time?/ Certainly the root
beer option was open to you at the time you replied to
me. We should not let the fact that the object of
choice here is phrased as an object disturb us, whereas
in (Tl) it is an event. We could have listed the options
as drinking root beer, drinking coke, and drinking ginger
ale. I think that we would say that you did choose the
first time.
We are slowly establishing the fact that choosing
need not be the first event in a causally connected series
of events all of which constitutes an action, for we
can say that our agent has chosen and yet has not com-
pleted the action.
Several pages ago we raised the question whether
choosing is ever a volition. It is this question that
has been our concern indirectly throughout this chapter
and directly in these last few pages. The major portion
of this chapter was devoted to showing that choosing is
not identical with a mere volition. More is needed:
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alternatives, etc. And sometimes it is not a volition
at all. In the last few paragraphs we have tried to
point out some of the problems that arise when we
say that choosing is sometimes a volition plus other
factors. V/e have not been able to show conclusively by
arguments or by counterexamples that a simple choosing
to perform an action now cannot be considered a volition
plus something else. Of course, an argument to the
effect that there is no such thing as a volition
would sound the death knell for (Tl) before we had a
chance to point out other defects. Rather than becoming
sidetracked by the question of the existence or non-
existence of volitions, we chose to see if a viable
theory could be constructed out of those advanced by
others. Now let us continue to focus our attention on
the concept of choice and see if we can produce a neater
theory, one not so prone to so many problems.
Chapter 3
CHOOSING AS AN ACTION
The first of several papers on the concept of
choice that have been published in the last tv/enty
years was by J. L. Evans. ^ His paper was also the
first to be published after Ryle published The Concent
o£ • With Ryle's attach of volitions and admission
that choice is an 'authentic process' as a point of
departure, Evans seeks to work out a theory of choice.
Evans takes pains to focus his reader's attention
on the concept of choice with a statement of what he
sees as the general pre-analytical agreement on the
nature of choice and a list of the problems to be
solved.
Choice, it seems agreed, is an activity which
Intervenes between deliberation and action, or
between intention and action, and it is the choosing
which makes the action moral or immoral. Action
can be Judged as morally good or bad only if it
is chosen.
The following problems, then, seem to remain:
(1) Is choice to be identified with, for example,
deciding or willing, or are they distinct activ-
ities? If distinct, how are they related?




( 2 ) Is it in fact choice which initiates action?
Or is it desire or willing or a motive?
(3) Is choosing a momentary act or is it a persis-
tent state?
(4 ) Do we choose first and then act or do we do
both together?.
(5) Which is the proper subject of praise and
blame, the choosing or the acting or both?
( 6 ) Do we choose ends as well as means ?^
With that statement as a backdrop, he proceeds to
present a catalog of the senses of the verb 'to choose*
and its cognate verbs. He sums up his findings as
follows
:
The verb 'to choose', then, is not a verb with a
clear unambiguous use. It is used, as we have
seen, in many ways which make it approximate some-
times to wishing, sometimes to preferring, sometimes
to willing and sometimes to deciding. My sugges-
tion is that in its standard use which can be
seen most clearly where it is followed gramatically
by nouns, namely in the simple situation where we
are confronted with two or more alternatives, it
is different from these other verbs. I am
suggesting, too, that choice has been misunder-
2lbid., pp. 305-6.
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stood largely because its standard use has tended
to be confused with deciding. This confusion has
especially affected the question of the relation
between choice and action. Realizing that deciding
is not to be equated with acting, moralists have,
through identifying choosing with deciding, tended
to give a similar account of choosing, so that
it has become usual to regard choosing and doing
as two separate, though casually connected,
activities .3
To further accentuate his point that the view he
is outlining is confused, he presents a brief treatment
of the relationship between choice and deliberation.
He is arguing that choosing is not an activity that is
separate and distinct from doing, that "...we do not
first choose and then act."4
According to the general view which I am discussing,
the connexion between choice and deliberation
seems to be as follows: When we are confronted
with a situation where something has to be done
we first deliberate, which involves the consideration
of alternative courses of action, then choose





three separate though connected acts or processes,
deliberating, choosing, doing. Far from clarifying
the notion of action, this account seems to add
further insoluble problems. In fact the possibil-
ities with regard to action would aupear to be
at least these:
(1) We can deliberate and do nothing.
.. .Thus the
statement 'in spite of deliberating for two hours
he failed to choose* can be paraphrased by the
statement 'in spite of deliberating for two hours
he did nothing', while the statement 'in suite of
deliberating for two hours he failed to decide'
cannot be so paraphrased. This follows from the
point emphasized above that whereas choosing can
be identified with acting, deciding cannot be
so Identified.
(2) We can act without previous deliberation....
( 3 ) We can deliberate and decide to do something
later on, or resolve or make up our mind to do
something later on ....
(4) We can deliberate and do something, in the
sense that we can consider various possible courses
of action and follow one to the exclusion of the
others. In such cases we can say that the action
performed was chosen. There is, of course, no
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need to say that we also decided to do it .
5
Thus Evans maintains "that the verb ’to choose'
never denotes a separate act ". 6 Since he has already
maintained that in the basic sense of 'to choose'
the verb is followed by a noun that represents the
object of choice, he is then able to state his theory
of choice.
Choosing X is, therefore, equivalent to talcing
X-rather-than-Y, or to saying that one is taking
X-rather-than-Y. Similarly where the verb 'to
choose' is followed by infinitives, choosing to
do X is doing X-rather-than-Y, or saying that
one is going to do X-rather-than-Y.
7
Let us try to put this theory into more formal
language.
(T4 ) For any person S, any object X, S chooses X
if and only if there is a Y such that S takes
X-rather-than-Y, or S says he is taking
X-rather-than-Y.
For Evans, (T4 ) expresses the fundamental sense of the






by infinitives instead of nouns. In those cases he has
an alternate version of his theory. Let us call this
( T4* )
.
(T4*) For any nerson S, any action X, S chooses to
to do X if and only if there is a Y such
that S does X-rat her-than-Y, or S savs that
he is going to do X-rather-than-Y.
The first thing we should note about Evans
’ theory
is that while he insists that every case of choosing is
a case of acting, he does not hold that every case of
acting is a case of choosing. He acknowledges that
there are cases in which an agent acts but does not choose.
In the quotation above, his statement of the theory
is cast as the conclusion of an argument. The heart of
the argument is the following:
(1) Indeed there seems to be no imnortant difference
in meaning between the two statements, f vou can
take either the uennv or the bun’ and ’choose
either the
-penny or the bun’.
(2) Choosing X is, therefore, equivalent to taking
X-rather-than-Y
,
or to saying that one is
taking X-rather-than-Y.
This argument is neither sound nor valid. First,
(1) is false. There is an imnortant difference between
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the two expressions within the single quotation marks.
The second is an imperative, whereas the first is not.
The second does not even have a truth value, so we can
not even say that they are truth-functionally equivalent.
This difficulty can be resolved if we revise the second
statement to read 'you can choose either the penny or
the bun*. Then (1) would read as (la):
(la) Indeed there seems to be no important dif-
ference in meaning between the two statements,
fyou can take either the penny or the bun’ and
’you can choose either the penny or the bun’.
We might also revise (1) to read as (lb):
(lb) Indeed there seems to be no important dif-
ference in meaning between the two statements,
’take either the penny or the bun’ and 'choose
either the penny or the bun’.
Second, does (2) follow from either (la) or (lb)?
The answer is "no”. Evans has substituted the present
participles "choosing” and "taking" for "you can choose"
and "you can take" respectively. Why he has done this
he has not said, but it poses no direct problems. He
also substitutes "-rather-than-" for "either
_
or _".
This substitution might pose no problems if he had sub-
stituted uniformly. But instead of doing so, he collapses
"choosing X-rather-than-Y" to "choosing X".
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If Evans is to be consistent, he must state the
left hand side of (2) as "choosing X-rather-t han-Y”
.
(2) would then read as (2a):
(2a) Choosing X-rather-than-Y is, therefore,
equivalent to taking X-rather-than-Y, or
to saying that one is taking X-rather-than-
Y
.
This may seem like a small Point, for it seems intuitively
clear that "S chooses X-rather-than-Y” implies ”S chooses
T* , but that is beside the point. The point is that
they are not identical. If they were identical, Evans’
theory would be in very serious trouble. We could col-
lapse both sides to form (2b).
(2b) Choosing X is, therefore, equivalent to taking
X or to saying that one is ta king X-rather-
than-Y.
Obviously, (2b) is not an acceptable theory of choice.
Every case of taking would be a case of choosing, which
is just plain false. And Evans states explicitly that he
does not want to hold that to be the case. So he would
not want to sav that "choosing X-rather-than-Y" is e-
quivalent to "choosing X", or that "taking X-rather-than-
Y” is equivalent to "taking X” . Note that we did not
collapse the other disjunct. This expression has problems
of its own, and we will explore them later. But if we
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had collapsed it, we would have encountered difficulties
similar to those we faced with the first disjunct.
There is still a further reason why (2) does not
follow from any version of (1). (1) is of the form
A is equivalent to B.
Let us say that as a result of the substitutions Evans
made A becomes C and B becomes D. But from
A is eauivalent to B
Evans then infers something of the form
C is eouivalent to D or E.
Note that (2) contains a disjunction whereas (1) does
not. So no version of (2) will follow from (1).
Evans bases his theory, as expressed by (2), on
the equivalence he claims obtains between "choosing
either A or B and "taking either A or B"
. But, as we
noted above, his expression of it in (1) is false.
We advanced (la) and (lb) as versions of (1) that w ere
more acceptable.
A closer examination of (lb) will prove fruitful,
(lb) is a statement of the equivalence of two imnera-
tives: "choose either the -Denny or the bun" and "take
either the penny or the bun". But are these eauivalent?
Suppose someone is holding a gun on another person and
says, "Take either A or B". ’A 1 is cyanide. *B f is
stricnine. Is that equivalent to "choose either A cr B"?
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One might reply that while the captive is being forced
totake one or the other, he is given a choice. But the
bolnt is that he is being forced or compelled.
Can one choose when he is being forced or compelled?
If he is given no alternative but to, say, walk the
plank, then he has no choice. But what if he is Presented
with several possible courses of action and ordered to
take one? At issue is whether an alternative must be
attractive, or at least not objectionable, to the agent.
But if we look at our collective experiences carefully,
we will discover that we have often chosen the lesser of
two evils. In these cases, all of our alternatives are
unattractive or undesirable.
Also at issue is whether we must be free from com-
pulsion in order to choose. Again, we can cite situations
in which we were under compulsion and chose. Consider a
context in which the compulsion is not so great or the
alternatives are not so drastic. The engine in my car
is wearing out. I am going to have to fix the engine or
replace the car. I can choose to do either one, but I
am compelled to choose, for I need a car.
Those who would object to identifying "take either
A or B" with "choose either A or B" on the basis of com-
pulsion have misunderstood the focal point of the com-
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pulsion. If you sre ordered, "Tcke A", you might say
that you have no choice. You are forced to nerfo™ a
specific action, taking A. But if you are ordered,
"Take either A or B"
,
the focal point of the compulsion
Is one step removed from your taking A or your taking B.
You are not being compelled to take A and you are not
being compelled to take B. But you are being compelled
to take one of them. And within the context of this
compulsion you can choose A or you can choose B. Thus
we cannot advance freedom from compulsion as a necessary
condition for choosing.
Those who wish to argue that "take A or B" is not
interchangeable for "choose A or B” might cite another
type of situation. Suppose we confront a person with
two different obstacle courses. He must go through one
or the other to pass a physical examination for a job
he wants, say, as a forester. Course A involves swimming
one hundred yards whereas course B requires no swimming
whatsoever. The applicant cannot swim. So he takes
course B. Did he choose B? Since he could not swim,
he certainly did not see course A as an alternative for
himself. When he learned that course A required swim-
ming one hundred yards, he would most likely have thought,
"I don’t have any choice but to take course B”. The
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point is that while "take either A or B" might be inter-
changeable for "choose either A or B" to the one who says
those words, they might not be interchangeable for the one
confronted by them. He might take B, thereby satisfying
that command, but he would not automatically have satis-
fied the command to choose.
Similar objections can be raised against (la). Sup-
pose I say, ,rYou can take either the penny or the bun".
The occurrence of the word ’can’ indicates that I see
these as alternatives to you, an important condition for
choosing. But you could still renly that you cannot
take the penny, for you cannot see it. (It is hidden
behind the bun.) Thus, while you c=n take the bun, you
cannot choose the bun.
Suppose, then, we reformulate (la) to read:
(lc) Indeed there seems to be no important dif-
ference in meaning between the two state-
ments, *1 can take either the penny or the
bun 1 and ’I can choose either the penny or
the bun'
.
The change in pronoun insures that the one who would be
choosing also sees the options presented to him as al-
ternatives. The truth of ( lc ) seems to depend on the
truth-functional equivalence of "I can take either the
penny or the bun" and "I can choose either the penny
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or the bun" and a loose synonymy ("no important difference
in meaning") between choosing and taking either one of
the alternatives from among which one chooses. How is
"can" used here? Apparently it is supposed to convey
logical possibility and physical capability and oppor-
tunity
.
Is (lc) true? If it is not, no version of (2) will
be acceptable. Any consideration of the qeustion of
whether choosing means the same as some tyre of taking,
or taking under a certain s et of conditions, will force
us to consider (2). So we will defer treatment cf this
problem to our analysis of (2).





. In the expression
"I can choose either the penny or the bun", "either
or —" is an exclusive disjunction. I can choose one
but not both on the same occasion. The expression
"
-rather-than- " preserves this exclusion factor,
so there is apparently no difficulty here.
The prime advantage (lc) had over (1), (la) and (lb)
was that it clearly exnressed the fact that the person
doing , the choosing and the taking saw the penny and the
bun as alternatives. Does (2a) preserve this important
point?
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The expression being analyzed in (2a), ’choosing
X-rather-than-Y
’ ,
does preserve this point, because
choosing implies the existence of alternatives, from
the perspective of the agent, at least. Does 'taking
X-rather-than-Y’ or ’saying that one is taking X-rather-
than-Y’ preserve this point? We are supnosedlv guaran-
teed at least two objects by both clauses. But they
need not be alternatives at all.
Suppose you hold our a tray to me with only one
brownie on it. I take the brownie. There are manv
other objects in the room—the chair, the table, the
kitchen sink. It is true that I took the brownie-rather-
than—the kitchen sink. But did I choose the brcwnie-
rather-than-the kitchen sink? Of course not. The
kitchen sink was not something I considered as an al-
ternative. In (2a) we could have any object substituted
for Y, provided it was not identical with the object
taken, and the right hand side of the expression would
be satisfied. But onlv alternatives would satisfy the
left hand side.
One might object that if we substitute uniformly
throughout the expression we would not be able to sub-
stitute for Y any object that would not make the left
hand side true; that is, Y, whater it might be, must
be an alternative to X in the eyes of the person doing
43
the choosing. But that is just the point. It must be.
And it must be stated so on the right hand side of the
formula. And I contend that Evans’ theory, as originally
stated, and as modified, does not contain this important
Qualification, either explicitly or implicitly.
Evans is apparently reiving on the expression
?
—-rather-than- ’ to perform the function of guaranteeing
that the objects that are
' n that relation in the formule
are alternatives, and are seen as alternatives by the a-
gent. But, as we have seen, it will not do that.
We want to say that ’S chooses X-rather-than-Y
’
means that S chooses X. But we discovered above that
these two expressions are not equivalent. What does
*
-rather-than- ’ mean? It seems to mean something
like ’





-to- *. The implication is that the one
item listed first excludes the one that occurs on the
right hand side of the expression. It appears to be a
relation that is as symmetrical ?nd irreflexive. We
cannot say that ’choosing A-rather-than-B’ is equiva-
lent to ’choosing B-rat her-than-A ’ . And 'choosing A-
rather-than-A
’
just does not make sense.
But we do need some clause to the effect that these
objects are both seen by the agent as alternatives be-
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fore him. So (2a) has to be modified, as (2c).
(2c) Choosing X-rather-than-Y is, therefore, e-
quivalent to taking X-rather-than-Y, or to
saying that one is taking X-rather-than-Y,
and believing that X and Y are one’s alter-
natives
.
Supporters of Evans » theory might object to (2c)
on the grounds that (2c) has the condition for alterna-
tives in a belief context. There is a considerable dif-
ference between having alternatives and believing that
one has alternatives. And Evans had not even mentioned
the possibility that one might consider something to be
an alternative for him when it was not.
Suppose we had not placed the condition that X
and Y are one’s alternatives in a belief context. (2c)
still would not have followed from any version of (1),
because there is a disjunction in (2c), as we pointed
out above, that does not occur in any version of (1),
and cannot be derived from (1) with the material nro-
vided by Evans.
We must keep the condition concerning the alterna-
tives in a belief context because of that second dis-
junct. ’’Saying that one is going to take X-rather-than-
Y” is certainly not interchangeable for ’’taking X-rather-
than-Y”. One could say that he is going to take X-rather-
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than-Y and then take X-rather-than-Y or take neither.
He might not be capable of taking either one, even though
he might believe he was capable of doing so.
Some might object that sometimes we take something
by saying we are taking it, such as a player at a football
draft session. The contention would be that we need this
disjunct to cover these cases. B ut in a situation like
that, saying that one is taking X-rather-than-Y jj? taking
X-rather-than-Y. That is how one does it. And we do
not need the ’’saying ...” disjunct to cover these
cases
.
Neither (2c) nor any other version of (2) will fol-
low from any version of (1). More important than that
point, though, is the question whether any version of
(2) will stand up as a theory of choice. Let us put
(2c) is better logical form and examine it more closely.
(2d) For all oersons S, for all X, for some Y, S
chooses X-rather-than-Y if and only if:
(1) S takes X-rather-than-Y, or S says that
he is taking X-rather-than-Y, and
(2) S believes X and Y are his alternatives.
I have interpreted ’’eouivalent” in (2c) as "if and only
if", an interpretation that I am sure is acceptable to
Eva ns
There are still problems with (2d), however. Y/e
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have noted above that »S chooses X-rather-than-Y
• can
not be taken as equivalent to »S chooses X’. Yet we want
to say that »S chooses X-rather-than-Y’ implies »S chooses
X’. And we definitely want to be able to say that »S
takes X-rather-than-Y' imolies »S takes X*. And these
latter expressions are surely not equivalent. Evans does
not sive us the machinery we need, however. Perhans we
can formulate a simrle meaning nostulate to rerform this
function.
(MPl)For all persons S, for all X, and for some Y,
if S chooses X-rather-than-Y, then S chooses X
and it is not the case that S chooses Y.
The corresponding one for the other pair would be:
(MP2) For all persons S, for all X, and for some Y
if S takes X-rather-than-Y, then S takes X
and it is not the case that S chooses Y.
We are still considering (2d). We have resolved the
difficulty of interpreting *
-rather-than- so that
when S chooses X-rather-than-Y we have the machinery to
enable us to say that S takes X as well as saying that
S takes X-rather-than-Y. But in (2d) the exnression we
are analyzing is ”S chooses X-rather-than-Y"
.
Yet we
wish to analyze ”S chooses X" f as Evans orignially form-
lated (2). We made the switch to the longer in an un-
successful attempt to make Evans* argument go through.
Let us restore that portion of (2d) to conform with
Evans' original statement of (2), which we also labeled
(TV*.). So (2e), (2d) 's revision, would also be (T4e).
( T4e) For all persons S, for all X, S chooses X
if and only if there is a v such that:
(1) S takes X-rather-than-Y, S says that he
is taking X-rather-than-Y, and
(2) 3 believes X and Y are his alternatives.
Will (T4e) stand un? No. Earlier we noted that no
version of (2) would follow from any version of (1) be-
cause the disjunction in clause (1) of (T4e) cannot be
produced by the simple substitutions Evans purports to
make. Again the second disjunct is the locus of the dif-
ficulty. A person could believe that coffee and tea are
his alternatives and say that he is taking coffee-rather-
than-tea, and lie. We could not say that he had chosen
coffee
.
The second disjunct in clause (1) must either be
struck or be revised. If we strike it, then the only
situation in which a nerson can choose bv saying he is
taking X-rather-than-Y is that in which taking X-rather-
than-Y is saying that he is taking X-rather-than-Y.
(TAe) modified in this way would be (T4f).
(TAf)E0r all persons S, and for all X, S chooses
X if and only if there is a Y such that
ue
( 1 ) S takes X-rather-than-Y, and
(2) S believes X and Y are his alternatives.
We are still not free of difficulties. Sun^ose a
Derson believes that he has two alternatives. But then,
without thinking, he takes one-rether-than-t he other.
He could do this sbsentmindedly
,
or without realizing
what he had done, or unintentionally. According to
(T4f) he would have chosen that alternative which he
took, but we would not want to ssy that he had actually
chosen. Choosing is a deliberate, intentional and con-
scious activity. The problem again lies with clause (1)
and is similar to the fault of the second disjunct in
clause (1) of ( T4e ) . The agent could fulfill clause (1)
unintentionally. He could take A-rat her-than-B and not
mean to do so.
We have dealt thus far only with what Evans considers
the basic form of choosing, where the object of the verb
* to choose ' is a noun. He states « va-riant form of his
theory for those cases where the object of the verb f to
choose f is an infinitive. Because it has been many Daces
since I stated this variant, I will repeat it here for
ease of reference.
(T4*)For any person S, any action X, S chooses to
do X if and only if there is a Y such that:
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S does X-rat her-t han-Y
,
or S says th^t he is
going to do X-rather-then-Y
.
This theory will fall rrev to the same problems as
(t4). Benefitting from the results of cur exploration
of these problems, we can state a revised (T4*), on the
basis of (?4f), as (T4*f).
( T4 f) For any person S, any action X, S chooses
to do X if and only if there is a Y such that:
(1) S does X-rat her-t han-Y, and
(2) S believes X and Y are his alternatives.
On the positive side, both(T4f) and (T4*f) state the
agent’s belief that he has alternatives. Both specify
the exclusion of all but one of these alternatives. And
both spell out the talcing or doing of that alternative
chosen.
When Evans speaks of the object of ’to choose’ as a
noun, he employs illustrative situations in which the ob-
jects referred to by the nouns are real objects. When we
added the clause on alternatives, we placed them in a be-
lief context. But clause (1) in (T4f) and (T4*f) and
their predecessors have both alternatives cited occurring
outside a belief context.
Evans does not consider the possibility that either,
or both, might be illusions. But how does one take an il-
lusion? On his theory (T4f)
,
the oblect chosen must be
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real. The object not chosen might have been an illusion
if the only reference to it occurred in the belief con-
text. But clause (1) refers to it as well.
There is certainly no reason why an object an agent
believes is his alternative, but does not choose, has to
be real. If we insist that it be real, then Macbeth
could not choose his sword by taking his sword-rather-
than-his daggar and believing that his sword and his
daggar were his alternatives.
The status of the alternatives in (TA*f) poses
similar difficulties. Need the alternative action not
chosen be real in the sense that the agent be capable of
performing it at that time? No. All he need do is to
believe that he can perform it at that time. And what
about the action the agent chooses to perform? Does
he have to be capable of performing it then? No. Many
shoppers choose to enter department store doors that are
locked. They then choose to enter another door. So
both (T^f) and (T4*f) are defective on this point.
Evans insists that one cannot choose to perform an
action unless he performs it. But what if someone
chooses to purchase a 1975 Chevrolet if he likes the
styling and if he can afford a ne'*’ car in 1975? It is
possible for him to make that choice now. We can view
his alternatives as purchasing a 1975 Chevrolet in 1975
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if one likes the styling; and purchasing a 1975 Ford in
1975 if one likes the styling.
On the basis of Evans’ theory, however, one chooses
to purchase a 1975 Chevrolet in 1975 by purchasing a 1975
Chevrolet in 1975-rat her-than-performing some other action.
Thus one cannot, on his theory, choose now to perform an
action in the future, or choose now to perform an action
if certain conditions obtain.
Evans does not mention any deliberation, or any de-
cision-making, taking place either before or simultaneously
with the choosing. He argues that while in some cases
choosing does mean deciding, this is not the basic sense
of ’choose an object’ or ’choose an action’.
W. D. Glasgow argues against Evans’ position in his
paper, ”0n Choosing" 8
,
maintaining that choosing is mainly
deciding, and that there is an element of commitment in
deciding that the view that choosing is an action lacks.
We will take up Gla show’s position in the next chapter,
but his emphasis on commitment bears consideration in the
light of (T4f) and (T4*f).
Evans is forced to stand on his ’ -ra ther-than- ’
expression when facing charges of ignoring decision and
commitment. Will that expression bear the weight? Evans
%. D. Glasgow, "On Choosing", Analysis
. 1957, Pp. 135-139.
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would not be disturbed in the least if we found that de-
cision is not accounted for, because he holds that choo-
sing is not deciding. To shake Evans' position, Glasgow
will have to argue successfully that deciding is a neces-
sary condition of choosing, what about commitment?
It might be argued that the exclusion characteristic
that '—
-rather-than- ' bears is a tvne of commitment
and that thus Evans' theory will not fall to criticisms
of a lack of the commitment factor. Is this what '
rather-than- ' means? Surely the exclusion character-
istic it bears is the point at which it might be of help.
But in at least one sense, commitment is not implied by
it at all. Suppose one is faced with a situation in which
he can do one of two things but not both. He might be at
a highway junction, and must turn left or right. His
turning left excludes the possibility of turning right,
but his turning left -rat her-than-right does not thereby
imply that he was committed to turning left as onnosed
to right. He might have been confused and bewildered
and turned left just to get our of the way of the traffic
building up behind him. No commitment would be involved
in his turning left.
Now suppose that after the traveler turned left he
pulled off to the side of the road to study his maps.
He discovers that either direction led to routes to his
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destination, But which one does he take? One route
would take him through some scenic villages he wants to
tour. The other route would tai^e him onto a new inter-
state highway, bypassing the villages. He glances at
his watch, discovers he is late, eliminates the village
route, and takes the interstate highway.
The traveler resorted to some deliberation and de-
cision-making which Evans does not want. Evans insists
that a decision alone is not a sufficient condition for
choosing. But he holds that deciding is not a necessary
condition of choosing either.
What do we do, though, with those instances of choo-
sing that involve deciding, such as this traveler’s case?
If he had not decided, he would not have chosen. Deciding,
in this case, was necessary for the choosing. Evans would
reply that choice is, as he calls it, a "retrospective
concept,
. .
(used to) distinguish perplexed from un-
Q
perplexed activity.”' Actions which were done after de-
liberation or after consideration of alternatives are
said to have been chosen.
Is it possible for a deliberation to be completed
and not result in a decision even though the problem has
been resolved? Is it possible for one to deliberate,
^ Evans, "Choice”, P. 312.
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and act on the basis of his deliberation (his action is
seen as a result of his deliberation) and yet to insist
that he never made a decision?
Let us go back: to the traveler deliberating about
the alternate routes. The upshot of his deliberation is
a choice. He has been deliberating for fifteen minutes.
Suddenly he says, "I am going to travel the interstate-
rather-than-the village route." On the basis of (T4*)
we would say that he had chosen. But isn’t this also a
decision? In both original versions of his theory, where
the object of ’to choose’ is a noun, or an infinitive,
Evans includes a clause allowing the agent to choose
merely by saying that he is going to take X-rather-than-
Y, or is going to -perform X-rat her-than-Y. In these
cases, I submit, the agent is announcing his choice,
and decision is an important -part of his choosing. 10
Nowell-Smith11 sees this point and builds his theory
around it. He says that saying that one is going to
10We dropped this clause from (TLe) because one could
say that he is taking X-rather-than-Y
,
and lie. If,
however, we are able to insert a clause to stipulate
that when an agent chooses X he takes X-rather-than-
Y and does so intentionally, then we might be able
to restore the "saying. . ." disjunct. The agent
must not merely intentionally say that say that he
is taking X-rather-than-Y, though; for he could lie
intentionally. He must intend to take X-rather-than-Y.





do something is not the same as doing it. It is what
he calls the "cold-storage” sense of "to choose", when
the actual action is delayed to some future time. Since
Nowell -Smith discusses this point and incornorates it
into his theory, we shall defer a full-blown analysis
of it until we consider his theory in Chanter 6.
We have been examining J
. L. Evans* theory of choice
as an action, as "taking this-rat her-then-t hat"
. We
have found that the formal statement of his theory needed
many modifications. There remain a few loose ends that
will be dealt with in later chanters. One of these is
discussed briefly in the paragranh directly nreceding
this. Another is Glasgow’s point that choosing involves
deliberation, decision and some commitment on the part
of the agent to the object of his choice. The central
question before us has been "is choosing an action and
only an action?" And this question will not be finally
resolved until later.
There is yet another theory of choice that casts
choosing as an action that we will examine here. That
theory is outlined by R ; chard Taylor in his book Action
and Purposed According to Taylor:





Acting from choice, similarly, is a perfectly com-
mon thing, and paradigm cases are easily supplied.
Think of a man, for instance, walking through the
cafeteria, who pauses before an array of a great
variety of juices then reaches for a glass of or-
ange juice. Here, certainly, is a perfect example
of an act of choice; namely, the actual act, which
consisted of taking one thing from among others
that were offered, and doing so under circumstances
in which those alternatives were, or were at least
believed to be, eoually available. No one should
seriously suggest that this man’s choosing was
something accomplished entirely within his mind or
his soul, and that the motions of his hands and
fingers were simply the observable effects of that
inner unobservable episode. There is no need for
any such inner episode at all. Had any such thing
occurred--had he said to himself, for instance,
”1 guess I’ll have orange juice this time,” or
something like that—and then, before taking it,
tripped and fallen, or been otherwise prevented from
taking the juice, no one would say that he had in
fact chosen the orange juice and that his act of
choice had then failed to produce its normal bodily
effect. On the contrary, one would only properly
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say that he was about to choose the orange juice but
was prevented. 13
Let us try to formulate the theory he outlines as
(T5) .
(T5) For any nerson S, any X, S chooses X if and
only if there is a Y such that:
(1) S believes that X and Y are alternatives
that are equally available to him, and
(2) S takes X.
Taylor’s theory will encounter some of the same
problems that Evans’ did. The absence of such factors
as deliberation, decision, commitment and intention give
rise to these difficulties.
One oddity of (T5) is that the terms ’’equally avail-
able” might exclude as instances of choosing some cases
which ere instances of choosing. The statement of these
cases hinges on the interpretation of ’’equally available”.
The stricter the interpretation, the more flagrant the
counterexample
.
Let us start with the strictest interpretation. Sup-
pose a person is to choose between glasses of orange juice,
pineapple juice and grapefruit juice. The glasses must
be within equal reach for him. If he has to reach farther
fcr one than for the others, then that one would be elim-
13Taylor, Pp. 76-7
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inated as an alternative. Now we would not want a theory
of choice that is so narrow as to exclude such an in-
stance as a case of choosing. S 0 "equally available”
must be understood in some ouaH fled sense. But how?
Taylor evidently wants to avoid the tyre of situation
in which the agent would have to climb a mountain in or-
der to get his Old Milwaukee beer, whereas he would
merely have to flag a passing canoe to get his Budweiser
beer. He would not consider them equally available.
Yet the makers of Camel cigarettes would have us believe
that someone who prefers Camel would walk a mile for one
rather than take another more easily available brand.
We no not need to stree the fact that the agent must
believe that the alternatives are real. Whether they
actually are or not, is beside the ooint. If they are
real, if he could take any one of them, but though that
all but one were not available to him, the one he would
take would not be a choice made from all of them.
But Taylor wants the agent to believe that these
alternatives are eaually available to him. Perhaps he
meant equally possible. But what do we mean, then, by
degrees of possibility? We could not mean that all
the alternatives were equally real. We could not de-
mand that all of them were actually real alternatives
fcr the agent, for sometimes we do choose only to find
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later that that one of the supposed alternatives was
really a blind alley.
The phrase "equally possible alternatives ,r is re-
dundant or mistaken. It seems to imply that one could
be faced with a set of alternatives that were not e-
ounlly possible. But if some course of action is an
alternative, it is a course of action that is rossible
for that agent to pursue. A course of action is either
possible or impossible for a person to follow. And if
he sees a course of action as impossible, he does not
see it as an alternative.
Taylor might be trying to exclude the type of situ-
ation in which a person is confronted with several pos-
sibilities, but chooses one by eliminating the others
as being too difficult, or too strenuous; that is, by
dropping them as alternatives. But isn’t this still
choosing, perhaps negatively, but still choosing? Cer-
tainly the agent believed that each of these alternatives
was available to him. But he did not believe that they
were eoually available in the sense of "eoually easy to
carry out". I suggest that we dron the word "eoually"
from clause (1) of (T5), for it is either redundant and
not needed, or misleading, or mistaken. So (T5a) would
be more acceptable.
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(T5a)For any person S, any X, S chooses X if and
only if there is a Y such that:
(1) S believes X and Y are alternatives a-
vailabls to him, and
(2) S takes X.
Taylor insists that one’s choosing is not something
that is accomplished entirely within his mind. He ob-
jects to any view that would cast the motions of an agent’s
body as simply the observable effects of an inner episode.
But he then insists that "there is no need for any such
inner episode at all.” Now this latter assertion is not
the same point as the former. It is not clear in Taylor’s
text (see auotation above, Pp. 56-7.) whether he believes
that they are the same or whether he holds that the sec-
ond follows from the first. The second certainly does
not follow from the first.
By excluding any mental enisode from choosing, Tay-
lor has eliminated decision, commitment and intention
from choosing. But one can unintentionally or acciden-
tally take one of two alternatives he believes he has,
and, on Taylor’s theory, thereby choose.
Taylor’s theory also precludes any conditional
choices and any cold-storage choices. Nowell-Smith
employs the term "cold-storage" to designate the type
6l
of choice where an agent chooses now to nerform an action
at some time in the future. Since one has to take that
which he chooses when he chooses it, according to (T5a)
#
one cannot choose now to take a vacation in the mountains
next summer. On Taylor’s theory, he has not chosen that
option until he has taken it.
Because he casts choosing as taking an object, there
is an awkwardness to Taylor’s theory when we speak about
choosing to perform an action. Evans did not encounter
this difficulty, for he presented an alternate formu-
lation to cover these cases. But we could easily trans-
late Tavlor’s theory into one which has the
-performance
of an action an the object of choice. Instead of saying
that a person chooses the orange juice, we could say that
he chooses to take the orange juice.
Above we noted that Taylor’s theory cannot deal
with the "cold-storage’’ cases of choice because the a-
gent has to take that which he has chosen when he chooses
it. Now Taylor does not include any time function in
the passage cited. However, if we were to allow the a-
gent to fulfill the conditions of choosing at different
times, we would be committed to equating taking with
choosing. It would be possible for a nerson to believe
at time t that he had X and Y as his options. Then, at
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t* he could take X. Without a single time function, we
could say that he had chosen.
But l&ylor insists that when the assent takes that
which he has chosen, he takes it from among other ob-
jects he believes are his alternatives. And he insists
that one has not chosen if he decides to take one from
among several objects he believes are his alternatives,
but is prevented from actually taking it.
Why should such cases be excluded as instances of
choice? On Taylor’s view where choosing is taking under
certain conditions, an agent certainly has not chosen
if he has not taken that which he chose. But this re-
veals a deficiency in his theory, for sometimes we are
prevented from taking that which we chose. Occasionally
we choose to enter department store doors that are
locked. We usually then choose to enter another door.
In equating choosing with taking, Taylor has also
excluded cases of conditional choice. On the basis of
(T5a) one cannot choose to take X if conditions P ob-
tain. If conditions P never obtain, then the agent
never takes X. And by (T5a) he has not chosen. Yet we
do make such choices.
Taylor’s theory also bars one from choosing prin-
ciples or purposes. How does one take a principle or
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a purpose? If we allow him to translate his theory into
a form similar to the variation provided by Evans to
cover cases of choosing to perform actions, we are still
unable to choose principles
. How does one perform a
principle? If we allow him to expand it to say that
choosing a principle is the same as choosing to perform
all those actions that one would perform if he held
that principle, then we are back to a problem similar
to that we encountered with "cold-storage” choices.
The agent has not chosen to perform all these actions
until he has performed them. And he has then not chosen
the principle until he has performed all the appropriate
actions
.
Perhaps Taylor would wish to allow a person to choose
to adopt a principle. But in what sense is this an action
or a taking? Isn’t it a decision? Yet Taylor insists
that choosing is not something that is accomplished en-
tirely within one’s mind. So he would not allow a person
to choose to adopt a principle by deciding to adopt it.
Consenuently
,
it does not appear that a person can choose
to adopt a principle according to (T5) or (T5a)
.
The genera 1 approach taken by Taylor and Evans is
to equate choosing with taking, or with performing an
action. We have found this appraoch to be defective be-
cause it is not flexible enough to deal with "cold-stor-
age” choice, conditional choice, and choice of principles
.
When choosing is identified with taking that object which
is chosen, or performing that action which is chosen, the
agent has not chosen until he has taken the object cho-
sen, or performed the a ction chosen. Thes, on their
theories, one cannot choose now to take an object later,
or to perform an action later, because their theories
require the agent to take or perform at the same time
he chooses. Similar difficulties arise with conditional
choices and with choices of principles.
These deficiencies might be avoided with an approach
that places more emphasis on decision, or commitment, or
intention. In the next chapter we will consider some
theories that attempt to remedy this defect.
Chapter 4
CHOOSING AS A DECISION
On the heels of J. L. Evans' paper came another
paper by W. D. Glasgow
.
1 Glasgow takes issue with Evans'
position that choosing is doing this-rather-than-that
.
The position that I wish to take up in this oaoer
is that while it seems possible in many cases to
substitute for the verb 'to choose* other verbs
such as 'to take* or 'to act', we must not there-
fore be misled by such language into ssying that
choosing is acting or doing this-rather-than-that.
The moralists, I will maintain, are trying to say
something important (however inadequately) when
they make choice an intermediacy between delibera-
tion and action, so putting it on the same logical
level as decision . 2
Glasgow points out that if we were to consider
choosing to be a process, some rather odd statements and
questions vould be acceptable. The statement "I spent
all the morning choosing a tie", is not itself odd.
But if choosing is a process, one who made such a
statement could be asked, “Are you going on choosing this
afternoon?" Glasgow attributes the oddity of this




question to the fact that
both the question and the original statement are
elliptical. The full version of the statement
might read "I spent all the morning looking at a
number of ties and trying to choose one of them”.
"this time X look at the ties, weigh uo their
merits and demerits, and eventually pick up one
and say "I've chosen at last!" Choosing then is
not a process: it is an upshot of a process.
3
The characterization of choosing that Glasgow has
outlined here does not seem to be substantially different
from the theory that Evans advanced. The point of
divergence is elsewhere.
Choosing, then, is an upshot, an upshot which comes
after deliberation on various possible courses of
action. Evans may well agree with what I have said
so far. Disagreement begins with the question of the
relationship between deliberation, choosing and
acting. According to Evans there are only two factors
involved in the total situation — the deliberating
and the choosing or acting (for the choosing can be
identified with the acting. Choosing he further






This seems to me to be wrong. Quite rightly,
stress is laid on the fact that in choice there
is always an awareness of alternative courses of
action. But if deliberation on alternatives is
involved in choice, surely there must be at some
stage a commitment, that is, a decision to take
one course of action rather than another. The
commitment is a commitment to a particular impera-
tive ("Take the bun") which is an answer to a
particular question ("Which shall I take — the bun
^he penny )• Since commitment is the essence
of choosing, choosing is not identical with the
actual doing this-rather-than-that
: the relation-




Choosing, then, is on the same logical level as
deciding; both are commitments to act, and both
involve fundamentally the same type of mental oper-
ation. Indeed, if this view is not taken, it must
be asked what is the relation between choice and
decision?' Evans, who believes that there is such
a thing as decision, refuses to assimilate it with
either choice or action, and in his account of the
total process leading from deliberation to action he
ignores it altogether. His two stages should surely
be three, deliberation, decision and choice of action.
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If a three stage process of this kind is conceded,
it becomes Just as easy, if not easier, to assim-
ilate choice to decision rather than action.
4
Glasgow summarises his position in this way.
Choosing and deciding are on the same logical
level. But choosing emphasises deliberation about
alternatives: deciding stresses the factor of
commitment (although both commitment and alternatives
are present in either case). In some cases (e.g.,
where choosing does not involve doing something
immediately
,
or even at all) the difference between
choice and decision is no more than this. At
other times (particularly in Evans's 'standard'
use) the difference is more marked. Choosing
then certainly seems often to be used in an 'umbrella'
fashion so as to include the subsequent action
(taking, buying, etc.), and one might mistakenly
think that an action verb alone can be substituted
for it. To make such a substitution is to leave
out the vital factor of commitment or decision.
This is the essence of my quarrel with Evans.
^
So the heart of Glasgow's disagreement with Evans






decision, a factor which his theory emohasizes. But he
actually advances two arguments against Evans. The more
prominent one is based on the contention that the sub-
stitution of action verbs for the verb 'to choose* is
inadequate. The other is directed at what Evans calls
the 'standard' use of the verb 'to choose'.
The first argument can be reconstructed roughly as
follows. It is in the form of a reductio ad absurdum .
(AL ) (1) S choases B iff 3 takes B-rather-than-C
.
(Evans' theory. RAP: assumption.)
(2) If S chooses B, then S is committed to B.
(3) If S takes B-rather-than-C, then S is
committed to B. (1,2)
(4) But it is not the case that if S takes
B—rather—than—C , then S is committed to B.
(5) So it is not the case that S chooses B iff
S takes B-rather-than-C. (2,4)
This formulation of Glasgow's argument is more
complete than any statement he makes. We should note
that the inference of (5) from (2) and (4) requires an
appeal to a principle like
If (If W, then Y, and it is not the case that if X,
then Y), then it is not the case that W iff X.
Support for (4) can be gained from points we made
in chapter 3 when we considered Evans' theory. Glasgow's
point is that it is possible for someone to take B-rather-
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than-C in a haphazard, unthinking or unintentional way.
But choosing B implies being committed to B, says Glasgow.
Suppose someone held a tray of brownies in front of
you and said H take one". And you took brownie B. It is
true that you took brownie B-rather-than-brownle C, or
brownie D, etc. But could you say that you were committed
to B, or to taking B? Once you reached out and picked
up brownie B, you were committed in the sense in which a
defensive back in football commits himself: by actually
carrying out one of the options before him. But this
does not help Glasgow at all. This interpretation does
more to support Evans than Glasgow.
Glasgow' 8 use of the term Commitment 1 is not the
same as that Just outlined. He equates it roughly with
‘decision*. Nov: did you make a decision to take brownie B?
Did you deliberate over which one to take? Which one was
the largest? Which had the most nuts? Will the nuts get
caught in my teeth? Which one looks the most fudge-like?
Or, if one is weight-conscious, which is the smallest,
and thus has the least calories? Sometimes we find
children deliberating In such a manner before taking one
brownie from a tray of them. But we usually urge them
to "take one, they are all alike".
Most times, though, the brownies are not all alike,
at least in size. And, on some occasions, when a tray
is thrust in front of us while we are talking to someone
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else, we reach almost without looking at the specific
brownie
,
and. take one at random* Other times we do look
at the brownies carefully, and take one deliberately.
01* these two situations the former is clearly not a case
of choosing. There is no awareness of alternatives and
the action of taking the brownie is barely more than
mechanical. But the latter situation would be considered
a case of choosing. We would be tailing one of a set of
alternatives, knowing, or at least believing, that they
were alternatives, and taking that one deliberately
or intentionally.
Where is the commitment that Glasgow says is
Involved here?.- He would say that we had make a commit-
ment when we decided to take brownie B. A decision
involves a commitment to do what one decides to do.
In this case, the commitment is to take brownie B.
Here is the crux of his disagreement with Evans. For
Glasgow, choosing brownie B involves a commitment to
take brownie B. For Evans, choosing brownie B is
identical with taking brownie B (-rather-than-C )
.
Now a commitment to take brownie B might be expres-
sed by saying that one is going to take brownie B or
by actually taking brownie B. This is just how Evans
exoresses his theory of choice. So choosing brownie
B for Evans is identical with expressing the commitment
to choose brownie B that is entailed by choosing brownie
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B for Glasgow. I have made this tortuous comparison
to bring out more vividly the fundamental disagreement
between them.
What about argument (Al)? The view of choosing to
which Glasgow is appealing would place the act of choice
Just prior to the act of expressing one's commitment, or
the action that would follow as a result of choosing.
Does his appeal to the need for a commitment carry any
weight? It does if he interprets
-rather-than- "
in a very casual sense. But Evans might maintain that
he was using it in a stronger sense of "B-rather-than-C"
.
The vocal emphasis one would add in stressing "B" might
express this commitment. Yet this tack by Evans is
of dubious value, for it will work only for the second
disjunct, which he poses as an alternate way of chocsing,
1-e., 11 saying that one is going to take B-rather-than-C"
What does one do when one takes B-rather-than-C? Does
one grasp the brownie more firmly? Lunge for the tray
and pounce on brownie B? No, if Evans is going to
squeeze some element of commitment out of his theory of
choice, he finds it among the properties of the expres-
sion "B-rather-than-C". And it is not at all clear that
he can do this.
Glasgow is a bit at odds, though, to prove that the
concept of choice contains an element of commitment if
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he has to appeal to It In order to refute Evans' theory.
The only ground he could stand on would be a pre-analytic
notion of choice, one that he is trying to clarify by
advancing his theory.
Glasgow does not in this paper present a formal or
even an informal statement of a theory of choice. One
point that i 6 clear is that he wants to maintain that
choice is "an intermediary between deliberation and
action, so putting it on the same logical level as
decision. "9 At many points he Indicates his views,
but they do not always seem to refer to one distinct
theory. He criticises Evans for neglecting the element
of commitment which he claims is in every choice. Let
us lift ou a number of passages that embody a theory of
choice.
Quite rightly, stress is laid on the fact that in
choice there is always an awareness of alternative
courses of action. But if deliberation on alter-
natives is involved in choice, surely there must
be at some stage a commitment, that is, a decision,
to take one course of action rather than another....
Since commitment is the essence of choosing,
choosing is not Identical with the actual doing
this-rather-than-that : the relationship between the
^Glasgow, 11 On Choosing", p. 135 .
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two is rather one of quasi-iraplicat ion.^®
The theory of choice embodied in this paragraph
can be expressed in the following way.
(T6) For any person S and any course of action X,
S chooses X if and only if there is a Y such that
(1) S is aware of X and Y as alternatives,
(2) S deliberates on X and Y, and
(3) S commits himself to "take X" or S decides
to take X rather than Y.
We should note that while clause (3) is in the form of
a disjunction, the two disjunct s are identical on his
view. This is what Glasgow means by * commitment* in
the paragraph just quoted. We will examine this view
below.
On the basis of (T6) "S chooses A" does not imply
"S takes A-rather-than-B"
,
as it would for Evans. For
Evans these two statements are identical. For Glasgow
the first "quasi-implles" the second. What does he mean
by "quasi-implies" or "quasi-imollcati on" ? He does not
say. It would seem, though, that he would want to allow
for the possibility of 3 choosing A but not taking A.
If someone chooses to follow a particular course of
action, but then takes no action, we would be apt to
ask whether he had chosen in the first place. But what
^°Glasgow, "On Choosing", p. 137*
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of the situation In which one is confronted with many
alternatives? First he chooses one, and may or may not
begin to follow it up. Then he chooses another, then
another, until finally he chooses one and carries it out
completely. Do we wish to say that he chose only once,
that is, the last time? Certainly we would become
Impatient with him if we were waiting for him to carry
out that course of action that he had chosen. We would
be apt to say something like, "Make up your mind". But
would we say that he had chosen once, or would we say
that he had chosen many times? If one had followed
right on the heels of another w*e would most likely have
said that he had chosen but once. But if he had started
to follow up the course of action (though not completing
it) or if he had held this commitment more than momen-
tarily, then we might have said that he had chosen many
times.
When one chooses, one begins to follow up the course
of action of his choice but finds it blocked, he tries
again. That is, he chooses again . Suppose at a dinner
party on6 is given a choice of coffee or tea. He chooses
coffee. He has the cup and saucer in his hand and goes
to add sugar and cream. Then he discovers there is no
more cream. But he cannot drink coffee black, so he has
to choose again. It is for situations like this that I
believe Glasgow holds that the relationship between "S
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chooses A” and "S takes A-rather-than-B" is one of
"quasi-implication.
"
Our dinner guest, though, did not expect to be
thwarted in his choice of coffee. He fully expected to
be able to drink his coffee as he usually does—with
sugar and cream. So why couldn't we simply add to (T6)
a clause stipulating that one actually carries out the
course of action chosen unless he is thwarted or changes
his mind?
In chapters 2 and 3 we noted that vie needed a factor
like decision or commitment to make choosing intentional.
Glasgow's theory (T6) supplies this factor of commitment.
He writes
But if deliberation on alternatives is involved
in choice, surely there must be at some stage a
commitment, that is, a decision to take one course
of action rather than another. The commitment is
a commitment to a particular imperative ("Take the
bun" ) which is an answer to a particular question
(which shall I take — the bun or the penny?" )11
Do we commit ourselves to imperatives? We might
commit ourselves to performing a specific action or to
following a particular policy. Glasgow views the
Imperative, "Take the bun", as an answer to the question,
"Which shall I take—the bun or the penny?" Presumably
lllbid., p. 137 .
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this question is one a person might pose to himself,
spoken or as a thought. But why should the answer be
an imperative? The answer would more likely be of the
form, "I will take the bun", an indicative expression of
a thought or an intention.
Glasgow does not spell out what he means by delib-
eration on alternatives. Apparently he would accept
the question, "Which shall I take — X or Y?"
,
as at
least part of that deliberation. And we would expect his
decision to be the conclusion of his deliberation. But
a decision is not expressed as an imperative. It is
usually a thought expressed by a sentence of the form
I will do A.
When a person poses to himself a question such as
Which shall I take—the bun or the penny?
he is considering alternatives. Glasgow stipulates that
the agent be aware of these alternatives. In every
illustration he employs the alternatives are real objects.
Yet in his theory he casts the object of choice as a
course of action. It is unclear whether he holds that
these courses of action are actually open to the agent
or whether he holds that the agent need only believe
he has the opportunity and capability to pursue them.
The definition of commitment employed by Glasgow
in (T6) i 8 quite different from that employed by Nowell-
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Smith and Lyles Brand.^ It would be possible for me to
choose something, but for others never even to know I
had done so, even though they were present when I had
chosen and the object of ray choice either was present
or was to be executed In that situation. Commitment for
Glasgow can be purely private and mental. Nowell-Smith
and Brand do not deny any nrivate or mental character-
istics of commitment, but on their views commitment
cannot be private or mental only.
We are going to consider Nowell-Smith’s and Brand's
views more thoroughly later on, so for now we will
present just a rough sketch. For Nowell-Smith commitment
is not a decision to do this rather than that.
...a private, unannounced decision does not commit
me to anything. If decisions involve any commit-
ment at all it is not in a full-blooded way,
but in the make-believe way in which premises
made to oneself are binding. ^3
So he disagrees with Glasgow's definition of commitment,
but he does hold with him that commitment is part of
choosing. The "full-blooded" sense of commitment
Nowell-Smith has in mind can come when one oromises
someone else that he will do something or when he takes
12
Nowell-Smith, "Choosing, Deciding and Doing", Analysis
.
Myles Brand, "Choosing and Doing", Ratio
. 1970.
^Nowell-Smith, "Choosing, Deciding and Doing", n. 65 .
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...such steps as to make a certain course of action
inevitable or more nearly inevitable than it was before . "14
Brand's use of commitment more nearly approximates
Nowell-Smith' s second form than his first.
The notion of committing used in condition (iii)
is not tied to announcing a decision of promising.
Basically, it involves taking steps to bring
about a certain outcome. 15
Brand then presents a fromal definition which we will
examine more thoroughly later.
The concepts of commitment advanced by Nowell-Smith
and Brand reveal a deficiency in Glasgow's. Theirs
emphasize some action that goes beyond a decision, some
tentative beginning attempt to carry out the course
of action chosen.
The lack of any required steos carried out as a
direct result of one's commitment is at the same time
a key weakness in Glasgow's (T6 ). There is nothing in
(T6 ) that specifies that a person must do anything
beyond "deciding to do this rather than that" in order
to have chosen. Glasgow states that the relation between
choosing and action based on, or carrying out, that
choice is one of "quasi-implication". Presumably one






spells out clearly what he means by " quasl-lmpllcation"
.
And this omission is a distinct deficiency with his
theory. He might disagree with Evans and insist that
choosing is not taking thls-rather-than-that
,
but
since sooner or later we expect to do something that
has a direct bearing on what it is that we choose, he
must make some attempt to spell out the relation between
choosing and acting.
In his paper "The Concept of Choosing" Glasgow
faces this problem more squarely. He writes,
For me, to choose is to decide to do (take) thls-
rather-than-that and the action implied in the
decision may take place either simultaneously
(as far as one can say) with the decision or
later
Choosing seems to be logically connected with
doing or taking. .. .Choice therefore involves
two factors necessarily, deliberation about
alternatives and a decision to act. The action
may take place Immediately or in the future or
not at all.
^
Unfortunately Glasgow does not face the question squarely
enough. How are choosing and doing logically connected?
^Glasgow, "The Concept of Choosing", Analysis i960, p. 63.
17lbid. 1 P- 63
81
Curiously enough, Glasgow does concede a sense of
choosing in which the subsequent action is included in
the meaning of 'to choose'. He points out that 'choosing*
is sometimes used as Evans uses it.
It does seem contradictory to say "I choose tea
rather than coffee, but I did not take either"
and therefore, Ev = ns concludes, "it is usually
correct to Identify the choosing with the doing
inasmuch as there is no gap between them". But
it is possible to argue that the contradiction
arises, not because 'choose' and 'take' can be
identified, but because 'choose' in such a
context is an 'umbrella' word.^
Choosing then certainly seems often to be used in
an 'umbrella' fashion so as to include the subse-
quent action (taking, buying, etc.), and one might
mistakenly think that an 'action' verb alone can
be substituted for it. To make such a substitution
is to leave out the vital factor of commitment
or decision. ^9
Nowell-Smith likewise acknowledges this 'umbrella'
sense of 'choose', but both insist that it is not the
fundamental sense. We will discuss in a later chapter a
^Glasgow, "On Choosing", p. 138.
19lbid., p. 139 .
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theory advanced by Myles Brand that is an umbrella-type
theory. At that point we will consider this approach
more thoroughly.
0. S. Franks presents another theory of choice based
on decision in his paper "Choice". 20
Is then decision to or resolving choice? The answer
seems to be that it is. Both resolve and choice
have been discovered to precede action, to be among
its preliminaries. Yet neither initiates action,
nor apparently renders it necessary: neither allows
itself to be identified with volition. Both
seem to be practical, not theoretical, acts as is
shown by the fact that the distinction of true and
false does not apply to them, while the distinctions
of good and bad, right and wrong, do. What is
chosen seems to coincide with what is resolved:
both what is chosen and what is resolved are
naturally expressed in words in the same form,
namely to do X. Lastly both choice and resolve
seem to be about ends and means: ends may be chosen
or resolved upon, a man can choose or resolve to
do X as a means. The accounts given of choice
and resolve or decision to agree at all points
20
0. S. Franks, "Choice", Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society
.
N. S., Vol. 34» 1933-34*
pp. 269-294 •
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and compel the conclusion that the words choice
and resolve are synonymous.
This theory can be cast as (T7).
(T7) For any person S, any action X, S chooses to
do X iff S resolves to do X.
Before we subject (T7) to close analysis, let us examine
Franks* argument that ’choice* and ’resolve’ are synon-
ymous. The argument appears to run something like this.
(1) Both resolving and choosing precede action.
(2) Neither resolving nor chocsing initiates action.
(3) Neither resolving nor choosing render action
necessary.
(4) Neither resolving nor choosing is identical with
volition.
(5) Both resolving and choosing are practical (not
theoretical) acts (i.e., neither are true or
false, but are good or bad, right or wrong.
)
(6) Both what is chosen and what is resolved are
naturally expressed in the same form: 'to do X*.
(7) Thus what is chosen coincides with what is resolved
(8) Both choosing and resolving are about ends
and means.
(9) Thus " choosing" and •'resolving" are synonymous.
Some observations first. Choice is a practical act, and
yet it precedes action. How? If choice is an act, does
21Ibid., p. 277
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not 'S chooses to do A' express an action? Franks apoar-
ently relies on the Identity of Indiscemibles to infer
( 9 ) from (l) - ( 8 ). But that is risky. How does he
know that he has accounted for every property of 'choice'
or 'resolve'?
Franks argues in ( 6 ) and (7), that since the object
of choice and the object of resolve are both exoressed
in the form, 'to do X', they coincide. But (?) does not
follow from ( 6 ). I express my intentions in sentences
of the form, "I Intend to do A". I express my hopes
in sentences of the form, M I hope to do A"; my wishes
as "I wish to do AH or "I want to do A"; my desires
-
as "I desire to do A M . Does Franks wish to conclude
that my choices are identical with my intentions, my
hopes, my wishes and my desires? Sometimes they are
identical, but not all the time. As we have discovered,
choice Involves the selection of one out of a set of
two or more alternatives. But suppose I have only one
course of action before me, A. I can intend to do A,
wish to do A, hope to do A, and desire to do A, but if
A is my only alternative I cannot be said to have chosen
to do A. So, while (7) might be true in some cases,
it does not follow from ( 6 ).
(T7 ) is quite brief. Unless one already knows
what Franks means by 'resolve', (T 7 ) sheds no light
on the meaning of 'choice'. Let us look at Franks'
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characterization of 'resolve' in the paragraph quoted
above. 'Resolve' precedes action but does not initiate
It or render it necessary. It is a practical act; it
is right or wrong, good or bad, but not true or false.
A decision is right or wrong, good or bad, and not
true or false. But is it an act? For the moment let
us set aside Franks' equation of 'resolve to' with
decide to'. To resolve to do X is to execute a orac-
tical act. Now to commit oneself to a particular course
of action is, at the very least, to limit one's options,
perhaps by eliminating some of them, perhaps by taking
steps that will bring one closer to executing that
particular course of action, or to make it more likely
that one will do so. As an act, a resolve to do some-
thing is a step toward doing it. Thus far we would not
be remiss in inserting commitment into the definition.
The crucial point is whether one can resolve to do
something, and thus commit himself to doing it, and yet
take no action toward carrying it out. In one sense
the answer has to be "no", for in resolving to do it he
has already made a move toward carrying out that partic-
ular course of action. But we are concerned with whether
he must do something beyond that.
A resolve does not initiate action, nor does it
render action necessary, according to Franks. Yet it is
itself a practical act. But it is a preliminary to action,
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and. there is a definite gap between the preliminary and
the action itself. How can Franks call a resolve an
act? He must hold that it is a mental act. He insists
that they are good or bad, right or wrong.
We saw in chapter 2 that not every choice is part
of a moral action. Franks is not maintaining that
choice is part of a moral action. He confesses that he
is not quite sure what the relationship is between
choice and moral action.
Curiously enough, Franks never mentions alternatives
or deliberation. One could deliberate, in the sense of
considering a course of action, and resolve to pursue it,
without considering alternatives. One's thoughts could
follow these lines:
(1) Consider course of action A.
(2) I believe I can do A.
(3) A has no bad consequences and is an attractive
thing to do.
(4) I resolve to do A.
But one who had these thoughts could not be said
to have chosen. He never considers eny alternatives.
Franks' insistence on a gap between resolve and
choice as preliminaries and the action that would serve
as their objects poses a problem not so much because
there is a gap but because he fails to specify what we
can expect to follow from an agent's resolution to do A,
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and the conditions under which we cna expect it.
He denies that choosing is a volition. He holds
that we can choose ends as well as means, but does not
say how. Thus his theory is defective because he mis-
takenly identifies choosing with resolving, fails to
include reference to alternatives, and neglects to spell
out what we can expect to follow from a person's choice.
R. G. Colllngwood, in The New Leviathan22 advances
a theory of choice in which he equates choosing with
deciding. His thoery is Interesting because he denies
that any preference is involved or that there is any
weighting of the alternatives.
13*1 A man about to choose finds himself aware of
a situation in which alternatives courses of action
are open to him. It is between these that he chooses.
13*11 I distinguish choice from decision only as
two words which mean nearly enough the same thing
to be left here undistinguished.
13.12 The kind of choice with which I am concerned
in this chapter is only one kind; the simplest; mere
choice, or mere decision, uncomplicated by any
reason why it should be made in this way and not
that; in fact, caprice . . .
.
13.14 Choice is not preference . though the words





are sometimes used as synonyms. Preference is
desire .as Involving alternat Ives . A man who 'prefers'
^ to h does not choose at all; he suffers a desire
for £ and an aversion towrads b, and goes where
desire leads him.
13.15 Preference involves a situation where there
are alternatives, but closed alternatives . There
are alternatives, for a man who cannot control his
fear of bulls, between walking calmly past this
one's nose and running away, but preference closes
the alternative and forces him to run away.
13.16 Choice presupposes that the alternatives are
open. A man in a position to choose whether he
shall walk calmly in front of the bull's nose has
open alternatives to choose from (13.1). 2 3
Glasgow had earlier denied that preference was a
necessary condition of choice. Now we have Colllngwood
Insisting that if there is any preference or any reason
why the agent feels he should choose one alternative
rather than another, then he cannot be said to have chosen-
/
in the simplest sense of choice.
The theory embodied in the passages just quoted
from Colllngwood can be cast as (T8). Colllngwood calls
this the simplest sense of choice, caprice. To distin-
guish it from other senses of choice, we will refer to
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it as (C)choice.
(T8) For any person S, and any action X, S (C)chooses
to do X if and only if there is a Y such that
(1) Y is an action possible for S,
(2) X and Y are open alternatives to S,
(3) S does not prefer X to Y and S does not
prefer Y to X,
(4) S has no reason why he should take the course
of action X as opposed to Y, and
(5) S decides to do X.
This theory is quite narrow due to Collingwood'
s
insistence that whenever one is confronted by a situation
in which he has several alternatives and prefers one more
than the others and takes that one, he has not (C) chosen.
The only type of situation in which one can be said to
have (C)chosen is that in which he does not care which
alternative he takes, but does decide on one. Does Col-
lingwood mean, too, that we have no reason for doing
X as opposed to not doing X?
We noted earlier that when one is confronted by a
set of alternatives, he sometimes makes his choice
negatively by eliminating them one by one until only one
is left. But the use of reasons in making choices
is not entirely negative. Most of the time they are
positive. Indeed, is not the process of deliberation
a consideration of the alternatives, a search for reasons
why each one would be good, a weighing of the merits of
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each one? On this view of Collingwood' b any delibera-
tion we might do prior to deciding would be reduced to
mere awareness of the alternatives as alternatives.
There is a plausibility to this aspect of Colllng-
wood's theory. When we search for reasons favoring one
alternative over the others, even in a positive sense,
we are looking for a way to resolve the dilemma before
us. Collingwood would say that we are looking for a
way to avoid having to make a (C)choice. We are looking
for some factor external to ourselves, or for some
excuse, or some reason we can use as justification if
we are called to account for ourselves.
Collingwood does refer to ways in which ’choose’
is used non-capriciously or purposlvely. But before we
consider them, let us point out some flaws in (T8).
The agent only need believe that he can perform Y in
order for Y to be considered an alternative. Collingwood
omitted this qualification. According to (T8) a person
chooses to perform an action by deciding, under certain
conditions, to perform that action. But what guarantee
do we have that he will perform that action? He does
not spell out the relationship between choosing and doing.
Collingwood characterizes this type of choice as
caprice. Suppose one chooses capriciously and another
person asks him why he chose what he chose. He might
reply that he preferred that course of action to his
alternatives. Collingwood is mistaken in insisting on
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clause (3) as a condition of capricious choosing. T0
choose capriciously all one need do is omit any prac-
tical reasoning from his deliberation. Then the
preference he may have had for choosing A, or any other
reason he may have had, did not play a role in any prac-
tical inference he made by which he arrived at his
choice. With caprice there is no practical inference.






decision to do X is not the conclusion of
any Inference he makes and he has no reason
/
that guides his choice of X as opposed to Y.
His restriction in clause (l) and clause (2) are
too strong. The agent need only believe that he can
perform either of his alternatives.
He notes that a voluntary act begins with a decision
to do it (13.8). This conception of the role of
decision is similar to the concept of volition considered
in chapter 2. But in paragraphs preceding and following
(13*8) he appears to equate decision with Intention
and allows for one to have an intention without acting
on it.
13.71. 'The will' is making up your mind, or de-
ciding, to do something; 'the deed is carrying
out that decision.
13.72. When I am conscious of deciding, the de-
ciding 1 8 the first-order object of my consciousness;
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what I decide to do 1 b a second-order object, an
abstraction from that.
13. 73* Like all abstractions, it is not quite de-
terminate. To a man making a decision the deed
which he is deciding to do is never completely
definite. He thinks of it as having certain
characteristics; the rest he leaves to be settled
when it comes to carrying out the decision.
13.85. The development of the process from the will
to the deed involves the progressive conversion of
intention or decision into performance. There ane
perhaps occasions on which thought turns wholly and
without residue into deed; more often the process
is incomplete, and some of what began as intention
ends as —what shall we say?—frustrated Intention.
Colllngwood seems to be wavering between holding that
decision is the beginning of the action and holding that
it is a preliminary to a voluntary act. He identifies
decision with Intention. But he does not provide the
machinery for distinguishing between a temporally
indefinite occurrent intention and a here and now occur-
rent intention. We will spell out this distinction
in chapter 8, drawing on the work of Wilfrid Sellars.
In the meantime, we will be content to say that a




I will do A.
A here and now occurrent intention is a thought of the form
I will now do A,
which is followed by my doing of A. Collingwood uses
•intention 1 in both senses without making the distinction.
(T8) would be more acceptable if we specified that we
were using •decides' in the sense of a here and now
occurrent intention. Then we can expect the agent to
exhibit the appropriate behavior of having a here and
now occurrent intention and doing A if he is capable
of doing it.
The difference between Collingwood' s conception
of (C)choice and non-capricious choice is that non-
capricious choice is purposive. An agent has a reason
for his non-capricious choice. He might decide to do
something because it is useful, because it is right,
or because it is his duty. (T9) expresses this sense
of choosing, where "(P) chooses” means "chooses
purposively .
"
(T9) For any person S and any action X, S (P)
chooses to do X iff there is a Y such that
(1) Y is an action possible for S,
(2) X and Y are alternatives to S,
(3) S decides to do X because it is useful,
or
8 decides to do X because it is right,
or
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S decides to do X because it is his duty.
Note that we had to drop clauses ( 3 ) snd ( 4 ) from
(T8)
. And in clause (2) the word 'open 1 was eliminated.
The agent has a reason for deciding to do X and thus
his alternatives are not open in the sense of unweighted.
(T9) is subject to the same observations and comments
we made on (T8) regarding clauses (l), (2) and (5).
The last theory of choice in which choosing is
cast in some way as deciding is advanced by T. F.
Daveney. 25 His theory is that choice is goal-directed
or purposive decision-making.
To sum up, choosing consists in making uo one'e
mind with regard to a particular object, action
or state of affairs, in a context of alternatives,
and the particular choice is made in the light
of best fulfilling some aim or requirement the
agent has in mind—in the sense that if the agent
"chose" something, but claimed that no requirement
or aim was fulfilled, we would conclude that he
was either talking nonsense, or concealing his aim.
25t* F. Daveney, "Choosing”, Mind, LXXIII ( 1964 K PP*
515-526. Reorinted in Myles Brand (ed.), The Nature of
Human Action (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and
Company, 1970), pp. 82-90. All page references are to
the reprint in Brand.
26ibld., p. 89.
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I am considering his theory with others which cast
choosing as deciding, though he does not wish to equate
choice with decision.
Now, although I think it is true to say that if I
choose an ooject or an action, I also decide upon
that object, or decide to do that action, it does
not follow that choice and decision are to be iden-
tified. The following example makes this clear:
"The instant I awoke, I decided to get up."
That fact that I made up my mind as soon as I
awoke, shows that my decision did not involve
passing alternatives under review, neither did it
involve a previous state of indecision; yet these
conditions must surely obtain if deliberation
occurs. In one sense, then, decision is neither
identifiable with choice nor is it necessarily the
product of deliberation. 27
Daveney also lays down some presuppositions for choosing.
(1) There must be alternative courses ooen to
the agent ....
(2) The agent must know that there are alternatives,
and that the embracing of one involves the re-
jection of the others....
(3)
1 must believe that the alternatives are possible
of attainment ....
2 ?Ibid., p. 88.
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(4) This condition 1 call the condition of aim
or requirement. It is more easily seen if we
consider cases in which an agent wants some-
thing, and considers a number of alternative
means by which his want may be satisfied. The
particular choice he makes can be seen as a
fulfillment of a prior requirement, and it is
this which guides his choice....
( 5 ) The alternative we choose is always considered
that which suits us best. 2^
I believe we now have the relevant passages from
Daveney's paper to serve as the foundation for a formal
statement of his theory. Let us call it (Tio).
(T10) For any person S, any object, action or
state of affairs X, S chooses X iff there
is a Y and there is a Z such that
(1) Y is an aim or requirement held by S,
(2) X and Z are alternatives open to S,
(3) S knows that there are alternatives,
and that the embracing of one involves
the rejection of the others,
(4) S believes that he can attain X and S
believes that he can attain Z,






(6) S makes up his mind to take, do, or
bring about X.
Clause (3) might be cause for some confusion the way
it is stated using Daveney's words. The confusion is
not entirely due to (3), for the problem arises partly
from (2). V/hat is it that the agent knows? He knows
that embracing one alternative involves rejecting the
others. It seems to me that the second conjunct is
acceptable. The first conjunct entails that there are
alternatives, that (2) is true. But this condition
makes (T10) too narrow. There are instances that we
would want to call cases of choosing that would be
excluded.
Suppose a traveler is at an intersection in the
highway trying to choose which route he will follow to
his destination. He examines his map and discovers
that both roads at the fork before him lead there. He
chooses the one on the left. Unknown to him, however,
the road to the right is undergoing reconstruction and
a bridge is out of service. Thus that road is not an
open or real alternative. He takes the one to the left
and we would say that he chose it.
This situation, however, is not a case of choosing
on the basis of (T10). Clause (l) is satisfied, for he
has an aim* to get to his destination. Clause ( 2 ) is
not satisfied. Although the map and road signs indicate
98
that either road will lead to his destination, the one
to the right is closed. The second conjunct of (3) is
satisfied, and (4), (5) and (6) meet with no difficulties.
The traveler believes that both roads are alter-
natives, that both will serve as routes to his destination.
But since the road to the right is closed, and will not
serve as a route to his destination, we cannot say that
he knows that both roads are viable alternatives.
The confusion in the first conjunct of (3) stems
from vagueness in the term 'alternative 8 and a loose
interpretation of the traveler's awareness of the two
roads as alternatives. By 'alternative* we mean that if
a road is an alternative to the traveler, and if he
chooses an option like the road under repair and con-
cludes, when he finds that it will not do, he chooses
again. The confusion I am pointing to is that an abor-
tive attempt at choosing is sometimes called choosing
by implication when we say ’’choose again". Yet we
would tend to say that the traveler could not choose
the right hand road on the basis of (T10), and that it
was not an open, vaible alternative. He only believes
it is an alternative.
If an agent's belief that he has alternatives is
sufficient, clause (2) is too strong. Yet there are
those with oerfect hindsight who would want to say that
the traveler who chose the left hand road had no choice,
99
that he could not have chosen the right hand road. If
the traveler tried to choose the right hand road, such
a person would say
,
"no, you cannot choose this one”.
But he could say this, say, from the position of a
passenger in the car
,
only if he already knew the road
was closed. If he, too, approached the intersection
without this knowledge, his response, after the driver
had tried the road to the right and had turned hack,
would most likely have been something like "you should
not have chosen that one", or "you chose the wrong
one.
"
These situations establish that belief that a
particular course of action is an alternative is an
necessary condition and, together with other conditions,
a sufficient condition for choosing.
So we need to drop clause (2) from (T10). Clause (3)
must also be changed. The second conjunct is acceptable
as S knows that the embracing of one alternative involves
the rejection of the others. The first conjunct,
"S knows that there are alternatives", is unacceptable,
for it implies that there are real or viable alternatives.
We need to change the operator from 'know' to 'believe'.
The first conjunct would read "S believes that there are
alternatives"
.
This revision of the first conjunct of clause (3)
is still inadequate, however. Suppose one believes that
100
there are alternatives. If he is not conscious of
specific options, his belief is not going to be helpful
at all. Suppose he believes that A is an alternative,
believes that there are others, but cannot specify
them. He takes A. Did he choose? No, for he should
have been able to say that in taking A he is rejecting
B or C. So his belief must be specific enough that he
is aware of particular courses of action as alternatives.
So (T10) needs to be modified to something like (TlOa).
(TlOa) For any person S, any object, action or
state of affairs X, S chooses X iff there
ie a I and there is a Z such that
(1) Y is an aim or requirement held by S,
(2) S believes that X and Z are alternatives
to achieve Y,
(3) S knows that embracing one alternative
involves the rejection of the others
( 4 ) S beleives that he can attain X and S
believes that he can attain Z,
(5) S considers X as the one that will best
fulfill Y, and
(6) S makes up his mind to take, do, or bring
about X.
Clauses (l) - (5) are the conditions under which one
makes up his mind in this modified version of Daveney's
theory. Is clause (5) necessary? V/e have Just considered
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a theory advanced by Collingwood In which choosing is
capricious. If that type of choice is at all viable,
then (5) must be struck. We will consider this point
again in chapter 8 when we discuss the role of delibera-
tion in choosing.
Another Question that should be raised is whether
all choosing is goal-oriented. Some of the theories
we have considered list this as one of the conditions
that are necessary if one is to choose. Most of the
theories considered in this chapter do not incorporate
this element into the context in which one chooses.
This question of whether choosing is necessarily goal-
oriented we will deal with in a later chanter.
The clause that makes Daveney's theory distinctive
is (6). He denies that choice and decision are iden-
tical. He claims, and rightly so, that there are cases
of deciding that are not cases of choosing. But what
does he mean by "making up one's mind"? The first synonym
that comes to mind is "deciding". He rejects decision
on the grounds that there are cases of deciding without
any deliberation. But, if we refer to (T10) and (TICa)
again, we will find that clauses (5)> (u) and (l)
imply some consideration of these alternatives, as
alternatives. Clause (5), in particular, implies that
some minimal deliberation takes place, even if it is
only being aware of them as alternatives and seeing one
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of them as obviously the best.
We are not trying to deny that clause (6) implies
deliberation. It does. But so do (l) - (5). What else,
then, is distinctive about (6) such that it is more
accurate and adequate than 'deciding'? As with deciding
there is a difference between 'malting up one's mind
that —
• and 'malting up one's mind to '. The first
is very close in meaning to 'decide that' and does
invol /e some deliberation. The second is close to
'decide to — '. Daveney never spells out the difference
he sees between 'decide to ' and 'make up one's mind
to — ' and why he prefers the latter, other than that
the first does not require any deliberation. The
latter does carry with it a strong sense of intention
or commitment to carry out that course of action.
But if I tell you that I have decided to do A, am I
not informing you of my intention to do A.
Daveney objects to equating choice with decision.
But he does not equate it 'making up one's mind'
_s_impliciter
. He spells out a set of conditions that
must obtain as the context within which one makes up
his mind before he will consider him to have chosen.
Why couldn't he do the same for decision? Why couldn't
he say that while choosing is not Identical with
deciding to slmoliciter . choosing is deciding to
in a certain type of context? Because I think that
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li© could have done so* and that the difference between
'making up one's mind to ' and 'deciding to '
is a matter of emphasis not substance, I have considered
his theory to be a version of choosing as deciding.
We should note that while one must make up his
mind under a certain set of conditions in order to be
said to have chosen, he need not try to carry out the
course of action chosen. On both (T10) and (TlOa) an
agent can choose many times in succession and make
no attempt to carry out his choice.
We might want to allow for changing one's mind,
but if one changes his mind one hundred times before he
begins to carry out any of the courses of action
supposedly chosen, we would demand that he make up his
mind. We would claim that he had not chosen in those
earlier cases and could tell him that until he commits
himself by beginning to carry out one of the alter-
natives before him, in our eyes he will not have chosen.
Yet Daveney's theory would serve as Justification for
him. He could claim that he had made up his mind,
many times of course, but that he had done 60 .
The problem here could be formulated as a question
of whether he is choosing again or changing his choice.
Suppose we are at a dinner party and one guest chooses
tea rather than coffee. A few moments later he asks
the host if he can switch to coffee. He is not asking
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to be allowed to choose tea rather than coffee, to be
served the tea and then to be allowed to choose again
and choose coffee rather than tea. "What he wants is
a change in the object of his choice. And if he had
already received the tea, he might ask if he could
trade the tea for some coffee. The difference here
is that if he were asking to choose again, he would
eventaully have two cups, not one.
The upshot of this discussion is that our choices
are not final until we have carried out a certain amount
of activity we can expect to follow from that choice,
if we are capable of doing so. Up to that point we
can change our minds, or change the object of our
choice. Yet since Daveney's theory requires and expects
no action beyond making up one's mind in a certain type
of context, those cases of changing the object of one's
choice become separate cases of choosing.
The theories we examined in this chapter suffer
from a variety of defects. The fundamental flaw they
share is the failure to spell out the behavior we can
expect from one who has chosen and the relation between
choosing and that appropriate behavior.
Chapter 5
CHOOSING AS SAYING WITH AN INTENTION
R. C. Skinner, in a paper entitled "Freedom of
Choice" 1 advances a theory of choice that bears some
similarity to a partion of <J • L. Evans* theory#
The most important condition for making a choice is
the possession of freedom of action . A person has
freedom of action if, in a particular situation,
there are two or more alternative courses of action,
which he is able to follow. Two or more courses of
action are alternatives when it is logically
impossible for a person to follow more than one of
them at the same time. 2
Secondly, for making a choice, there must not only
be two or more alternative courses of action,
either of which one is able to follow, but one must
also know, or at least firmly believe, that one is
abl,e to follow either of them. 1
In a situation, then, where there are two alter-
native courses of action, X and Y, which one is
able to follow, and which one knows, or at least
^R. C. Skinner, "Freedom of Choice", Mind . Vol. LXXII,






firmly believes, that one is able to follow, one is
able to make a choice between them. And choosing
to do one of them, X, consists merely in saying to
oneself, or to another person, M I will do X", with
the intention of doing it.... It is not, however,
necessary actually to do X, or even to try to do
it>
A choice can also be made which is not preceded by
a decision that the course of action is best in
the circumstances ... .A person may choose at random,
or hastily or without thinking, or irrationally,
but he still chooses for all that. All that is
necessary for making a choice is a firm, and correct,
belief at the time one makes one’s choice that
there are two or more alternative courses of action
that one is able to follow; and then one has made
a choice when one says to oneself or to another
person "I will do so-and-so”, with the intention
of doing it .
5
Before we can present a formal statement of Skinner's
theory we have to deal with some apparent inconsistencies
in the passages Just cited. Of particular concern is
the status of alternatives. According to the first pas-
sage, the agent must have at least two alternatives
^Ibid., p. 466.
5 lbid., p. 469.
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that are viable. Skinner retreats from such a strong,
narrow position in the second passage by adding the
qualification that the agent must at least believe he
can follow either of them. In the third passage he
combines the first two, requiring "two alternative
courses of action, X and Y, which one is able to follow,
and which one knows, or at least firmly believes, that
one is able to follow...." But in the fourth passage
he requires "...a firm, and correct, belief ... that
there are two or more alternative courses of action..."
open to him. Obviously, these four statements are not
equivalent, and we cannot, without inviting problems,
incorporate all four into a formal statement of a theory
of choice.
We saw in the previous chapter that to insist that
each alternative be real—that the agent be able to
follow each one through to completion—is too narrow a
condition for a viable theory of choice. So let us
drop this one. We found no objections to earlier
versions of the second one, so we can consider it as a
candidate. The third passage contains that objection-
able aspect of the first one, so we will have to discard
it. The fourth passage does not require that the agent
know that these alternatives are real; it requires
that he believe correctly that two or more alternatives
would be each capable of being carried out. So we
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must discard the fourth as well. Thus only the second
Is left.
A further problem v:e should look at briefly is the
conception of an alternative outlined in the first
passage. ''Two or more courses of action are alternatives
when it is logically impossible for a person to follow
more than one of them at the same time." First, Skinner
should change the logical connective to a biconditional.
Second, on the basis of this definition, a logically
impossible course of action could serve as an alter-
native. Suppose I consider going to sleep and drawing
a round square as two courses of action. It is logically
Impossible for me to do more than one of them at the
same time. It is logically impossible for me to do
more than one even if I try to do them sequentially,
because one of them is logically impossible period.
Third, his definition is so broad that actions a
person is physically incapable of performing qualify
as alternatives for him. It is logically possible for
me to run a mile in less than four minutes. It is
logically oossible for me to swim the English Channel.
And it is logically impossible for me to do more than
one of them at the same time. These courses of action
are alternatives for me on Skinner* s criterion. But
I am physically incapable of performing either of them.
Thus it is physically Impossible for me to perform
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either of them.
I may believe that I am capable of performing them,
and not be able to do so, but that is beside the point.
By Skinner's criterion I can believe correctly that
these courses of action are alternatives for me, when
I am physically incapable of performing either of them.
Note that one may believe that he is physically capable
of performing an action that he is physically incapable
of performing. The purpose of this definition is to
spell out what the agent believes about these possible
courses of action.
Perhaps Skinner's definition could be modified to
something like this.
(D-A2) Two or more courses of action are alter-
natives to an agent iff it is physically
possible for him to carry out either one
of them and he has the opportunity to carry
out either one of them and it is physically
impossible for him to follow more than one
of them at the same time.
We will try to clarify the concept of an alternative
further in chapter 8, so with this note we will pass
on to consider Skinner's theory.
The heart of his theory in expressed in these lines,
110
And choosing to do one of them, X, consists merely
in saying to oneself, or to another person, ”1
will do X", with the intention of doing it....
It is not, however, necessary actually to do X,
or even to try to do it.^
We can formulate his theory as (Til).
(Til) For any person S, any course of action X, S
chooses X iff there is a Y such that
(1) Y is a course of action,
(2) S believes X and Y are alternatives for him,
(3) S says, "I will do X", and
(4) S has the intention of doing X.
This is the only ulieory I have uncovered in recent oapers
where choosing is linked so closely with an intention.
Choosing has been linked with "deciding to" and "making
up one's mind" but not so far with intention. Unfortun-
ately, Skinner does not give us the slightest hint as
to how he is using the term 'intention'. He evidently
would consider as a case of choosing a situation in
which a person satisfied conditions (l) - (4) and yet
did not even try to carry out the course of action he
had chosen.
Suppose the agent has the intention to do X and







believes that he has the opportunity to do X. On what
grounds can Skinner hold that the agent need not try
to do X? If he allows the agent to say, "I want to do
it, but I will do it sane other time", what is his
conception of the connection between intention and action?
Skinner cannot mean that the agent has the inten-
tion to do X now and need not try to do X. That would
be untenable. If an agent believes that he has the
ability and opportunity to do something, and has the
intention to do it now, we expect him to do it now. If
he does not do so, or does not try to do so, then we
say that he does not have the intention of doing it
now, or is incapable of doing it. Trying to do it now
or doing it now is what normally follows having the
intention of doing it now.
It is unfortunate that Skinner added that it was not
even necessary for the agent even to try to do what he
has chosen to do, for the Introduction of the concept
of intention appeared to be promising. One of the diffi-
culties we encountered with theories of choice based
on decision was that the connection between decision
and action was vague and uncertain. We could not be
sure once a person decided to follow a certain course
of action that he was actually going to follow it through.
We wanted to allow for the possibility of the agent
to change his mind. But on the decision-based theories,
changing one's mind often meant choosing again rather
112
than changing one* s choice* So one could, choose many
many times and still do nothing.
Before we proceed further we should note a flaw
in (Til) that is related to a problem we discussed
above. Clause (l) is stated as Skinner spells out his
position in the passages cited. But in the course of
criticizing his definition of alternative, we noted
that the agent merely has to believe that he has two
or more alternatives. Skinner wants the agent to firmly
believe and correctly believe that he is able to follow
either one of them. We will grant him all the firmness
in that belief that he desires, but we will not concede
correctness. The agent could be mistaken. He might
not be capable of performing either of them. Y might
be logically impossible as well. So we will have to
eliminate clause (l).
Skinner holds that one can make a choice without
first deciding that the course of action chosen is the
best in the circumstances.
It is not that he denies that deciding that an
alternative is the best available is related to choosing.
Vihat he denies is that it is a necessary condition of
choosing. He distinguishes as three separate activities
“deciding that a particular course of action is best for
you in the circumstances, choosing that course of action,
and actually following it; and being different, ary one
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of these can exist without either of the others. "7
We have already commented on the difficulties
raised by holding that one can choose a particular course
of action but not actually follow it. And we have
observed that one can choose without first deciding that
that course of action chosen is the best available.
But is it possible to choose without deciding which
one to take? Skinner notes that we can choose at ran-
dom. And this would apparently be a case of choosing
without deciding which one to take. Such a case might
be a situation in which we are offered a chocolate from
a box of identical chocolates. We look at the choco-
lates and cannot make up our mind which one to take.
So we say, "Oh, I'll just take one at random". This is
a case of choosing. But can we say that we did not
decide to choose at random?
Yet for him choosing is saying, "I will do X",
with the intention of doing it. If we hold that choosing
is deliberate intentional behavior, how can we choose
without thinking? If we must have an intention to do
that which we choose, how can we choose without thinking?
Perhaps Skinner means "without deliberation", or
"without practical reasoning", instead of "without
thinking". We raised in a previous chapter this same
question and we will encounter it again in chapter 6.
?Ibid., p. 469.
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He insit s that the agent at least believe that the
alternatives are available to him. Can one believe some
thing is an alternative without deliberating? At the
very least we must be aware of the alternatives as alter
natives. We must believe that we can carry them out
if we choose them. All of this involves a certain
amount of conscious consideration of them. We could
have the experience of having one alternative stand out
as obviously superior to the others without having to
pause and carefully deliberate. But in order to have
that happen we have to have at least begun to consider
them, even if only for a split second. This, I believe,
qualifies as minimal deliberation.
Skinner says that wre can choose irrationally.
What does he mean by that? That the choice itself is
considered irrational? That the process of choosing
is irrational? How can an intention be irrational?
What Skinner must mean is that the choice is irrational
in that it is foolish, contrary to reason, or is incon-
sistent with the stated aims and purposes of the agent.
It might be a faulty practical inference. Then,
to choose irrationally is to make a bad choice. We
all make mistakes, but we don't do them intentionally.
His choice must be intentional on the basis of (Til).




Lastly, Skinner holds that a person must say, to
himself or to another person, "I will do A", if he is
to choose to do A. But one's failure to say "I will
do A" should hardly imply that he does not choose to do
A. One could choose to do A without saying anything.
So both clause (3) and clause (4), which constitute the
heart of (Til) are defective.
As we have seen, Skinner's theory is frought with
problems. Its main interest to us lies in his use of
intentions as part of the act of choosing. We will
pick up this strand again in a later chanter.
Chapter 6
CHOICE AS ACTION OH DECISION
In chapter 3 we considered theories that cast
choice as a type of action. In chapter 4 we considered
theories that cast choice as a type of decision. p. H.
Nowell-Smith wrote a paperl in response to Glasgow*
s
first paper (which we discussed in chanter 4) advancing
a theory that is a hybrid of these two. **I shall main-
tain that the fundamental sense of 'choose* is much
nearer to 'do* and that the sense in which it is akin
to 'decide* is secondary . "2
But choice is not an intermediary (between delib-
erating and doing). For, while deciding to do,
in the paradigm sense, and doing are always two
things, even when doing follows hard on the heads
of deciding, choosing and doing are not always two
things. Choosing is not .lust doing, nor is it
something other than doing and causally connected
to it, it is doing-this-rather-than-that
We can certainly use 'choose* in cases which involve
no actual (physical or metaphorical) taking or










or doing. For example, I have been studying all
the advertisements and have now chosen my new car.
Alternatively I have decided which car to buy (next
spring). Can we then say that in these, the 'cold-
storage' cases, 'choose' and 'decide' are synonymous?
Perhaps, but I am not sure. To decide is, in this
case, still to resolve a doubt or difficulty; and,
in .thi s case
, the doubt or difficulty happens to
be concerned with choosing a car. So the decision
is, as it happens, a choice* But when a decision
is also a choice, it is so rather in the way that
a number is (also) the solution to a problem or
a man is (also) a husband.^
Deliberating, deciding, intending—to say nothing
of advising and commanding—cluster round doing;
they are intelligible only in connection with doing,
if only for the obvious reason that deliberating
is deliberating what to do, and so on. For this
reason I started wi th the deliberative question,
'what shall I do?'; and in this, the fundamental
case, 'do' and 'choose to do* are synonymous, since
the deliberative form insures the presence of alter-
natives. From this fundamental sense of 'choose'
it is not difficult to pass in different directions
to the umbrella sense in which it covers more than
^Ibid., pp. 65-6.
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a physical or metaphorical taking-this-rather-
than-that and to the cold-storage sense in which
a decision to take this rather than that is
substituted for an actual taking. It may be that
this last sense is now the commonest; maybe not.
In any case it cannot be fundamental since the idea
of deciding to do this rather than that in the
future is parasitic on the idea of doing this
rather than that now.^
These passages are the heart of Nowell-Smith’s
paper. The theory he is advancing is a combination of
Evans' and Glasgow's. He considers part of Evans'
theory to be the basic or fundamental sense. Evans'
theory, we may recall, roughly equated choosing with
taking this-rather-than-that
. The secondary sense
of 'choose', when the verb was followed by an infini-
tive, was that of 'doing this-rather-than-that'.
It is this secondary sense that is similar to
Noiirell-Smith' s fundamental sense. He does not draw
the distinction between taking and doing that Evans draws.
He does use the term 'take' in the last passage quoted,
but he has already firmly stated that choosing is
basically an action, a doing . Some may say that taking
is an action too. Yes. But the object of choice for
choosing as taking is an object, whereas the object of
5lbid., p. 67 .
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choice for choosing as doing Is an action. And the
f ocu8 is on the action not on any object for Nowell-
Smith. So his theory will look something like (T12).
(T12) For any person S, any action X, S chooses
X if and only if there is a Y such that
(1) Y is an action, and
(2) (a) S does-X-rather-than-Y
or
(b) S decides to do X rather than Y.
First some observations. In the fundamental sense
of 'choose 1
,
(2a), Nowell-Smith uses hyphens whereas
in the derivative sense, (2b) he does not. Why? He
does not say. His formulation (2a) also differs from
Evans' derivative sense in that it has one more hyphen.
Evans' version reads "S does X-rather-than-Y" . Note,
too, that Nowell-Smith's theory makes no provision for
the agent to choose by saving that he is going to do
X rather than Y, as Evans' does. Nowell-Smith will
allow (2b) to stand as the meaning for 'choose' only
when the actual action is to take place some time after
the choice (decision) is made.
Again, as we had with Evans, we have difficulties
with alternatives and the expression " -rather-than-
We noted in chapter three that it did express the
exclusion of one course of action. But the course of
action excluded did not have to be an alternative, or
even believed to be an alternative. So we need to know
that Y is believed to be an alternative.
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Is doing something while believing one has alter-
natives an instance of choosing? Glasgow would point
out that there is something missing, some clause that
would express commitment. He would be satisfied with
(1) and (2b) plus a clause qualifying Y as an alternative.
Roughly, we will find that Nowell-Smith 1 s theory
falls prey to the problems of the theories discussed in
chapter 3 if the choice is (l) and (2a), and the problems
of chapter 4 are his if the choice follows the path of
(1) and (2b). We will leave it to the reader to retrace
those steps.
The major difference afforded by Nowell-Smith'
s
theory, besides the disjunction (2), is the extra
hyphen in (2a). Does this make more than a visual
difference between his and Evans' theory? The auxiliary
verb 'does' is now incorporated into one hyphenated
predicate. I don't think it does make a substantial
difference.
The appeal of this theory was that perhaps by com-
bining in some way choosing as doing and choosing as
deciding the pitfalls of each would be avoided. This
hope was not realized, for in the end, Nowell-Smith
holds that 'doing' is the fundamental sense of 'choosing',
and that 'deciding 1 is a derivative sense. And his use
of the disjunction means that we will have either the
problems of chapter 3 or the problems of chapter 4 ,
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rather than their resolution. We will have to wait
until a later chapter to consider an attempt to combine
them more completely.
Chapter 7
CHOOSING- AS A COMPLEX ACTION
The most complex statement of a theory of choice
that we will consider is advanced by Myles Brand. He
holds that choosing Is an action. But his statement
includes factors that we noted were missing from Evans’
and Taylor’s theories. His theory, which we will call
(T13), he numbers (lb) and states it as follows:
(T13) (lb) For every person S, every action a, and
time t, S chose to perform a at t if and
only if there is an x such that:
(1) x is an action performed by S;
(ii) S's having performed x is identical
with S's having chosen to perform a;
(iii) S's having performed x is identical
with S's having committed himself to
perform a;
(iv) at t, S believed that there were alter-
native actions within his power; and
(v) at t, S preferred to perform a more
than the alternative actions.
The notion of committing used in condition (iii)
is not tied to announcing a decision or promising.
Basically, it involves taking steps to bring about
a certain outcome. This sense of 'committing'
is precisely definable in the following manner:
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(Ibl) For every person S and every action a,, S
committed himself to perform a if and only if:
(i) there is a set of actions such that S
performed each of these actions and such
that S justifiably believed that this set
was the total set of requisite actions for
performing a:
or
(ii) there is a set of actions such that S
would have performed each of these actions
if he had had the opportunity to perform
them and such that S justifiably believed
that this set was the total set of requisite
actions for performing a. 1
This theory is different in many ways from those
of Evans, Taylor, and Nowell-Smith who also hold that
choosing is doing. First, Brand states his in the past
tense. He formulates it this way "to indicate clearly
that there is no on-going process of choosing. Choosings
are end-stages of processes or activities
2
Second,
Brand includes commitment, belief that there were alter-
natives within the agent's power, and preference of the
action chosen, whereas the other three do not.
^Myles Brand, "Choosing and Doing", Ratio, Vol. XII,
June 1970, p. 90.
2lbid., p. 86.
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Brand's theory Is initially the most plausible of
those we have considered. It seems to have included
the factors the others omitted. But it is not without
its problems.
First, (T13) is circular. Brand has introduced
the expression he is defining in clause (ii).
Second, what happens at time t? Does S choose at
.t? Does S perform at Jt the action he chose? Or does he
do both at t? From Brand's careful statement of his
reasons for using the past tense and from (T13), I
think we can say that he has both in mind. But why
couldn't an agent choose at t to perform an action
later at _tw ? People do choose in this way. This is
the cold-storage sense of choosing outlined by Nowell-
Smith.
Brand holds that choosing is terminal and casts
his theory in the past tense. One has not chosen,
according to (T13), until he has committed himself to
performing the action he has chosen to perform. And
by hie definition of commitment, an agent has not
committed himself to performing an action a until he
has performed, or would have performed if he had had
the opportunity, every action he justifiably believed
was requisite for performing action a,.
One of the conditions of choice, clause (iii) of
(lb), is that S's having performed 2S is identical with
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8* s having committed himself to performing 3. Suppose
8 chooses to perform a. Suppose, too, that the total
set of actions that S believes is requisite for per-
forming a is such that S does not believe he can perform
them and does not perform them. Thus clause (l) of
Brand's definition of commitment does not apply. But
clause (il) does, for he would have performed them if
he had had the opportunity to do so. Then, by clause
(lii) and clause (l) of (lb), S has performed an action
x which is identical with a set of actions none of which
he has performed. He has done something which is
identical with nothing he did. The problem is that
Brand's theory commits him to equating something
categorical v/ith something merely hypothetical.
Brand's definition also cannot deal with cases
of choosing at one time to perform an action at another




and t;*. An agent S chooses at t, to perform
an action
_a at t,*. At
_t' can v/e say that S has chosen
to perform a? He did not perform a at Jfc. And since
performing a is requisite for performing a,, S has not
committed himself to performing a, on the basis of
(ibl-i). Suppose that he had the opportunity to perform
a, at t. Since he did not do so he has not committed
himself to performing a, according to (ibl-li) either.
Some might object to this criticism and point out
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that S did not merely choose to perform a; he chose to
perform a at t*. But then we can say that I have now
committed myself by clause (ii) to buying a new car
last year, because I would have done so if I had had the
opportunity. If I look into my past and think of an
action c that I did not perform but now wish I had
performed, I have committed myself to performing c,
because I would have performed c if I had had the
opportunity.
If we look more closely at Brand's total set of
requisite actions we will uncover another flaw in his
definition of commitment. He supplements his definition
with a definition of "requisite action".
An action, say b, is a requisit e action of person
S for performing a if and only if, under the given
conditions, S is unable to perform a unless he
performs b.4
The example he gives is that a requisite action for
drinking orange juice is lifting the glass. Now
suppose vie take as our total set of requisite actions
for drinking orange juice {swallowing, opening one's
mouth, and lifting the glassT- • Suppose S performs
each of these actions, in that order. Obviously the
order is wrong. But Brand mentioned nothing about
^This criticism was suggested to me by Fred Feldman.
^Brand, _op clt , pp. 90-1.
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order. And this set is identical to the set {^lifting
the glass, opening one's mouth, bwallowing
,
on the
basis of the principle of extensionallty
. All he
specifies is that the set is believed to be the "total
set". Thus the agent, under (ibl-i), had done every-
thing he thought necessary for performing a, or drinking
orange juice, but none of the juice reached his
stomach. Y.e could patch up both clause (l) and clause
(il) by specifying that the total set of requisite
actions must be an ordered n-tuple of actions,, not Just
any ordered n-tuple, but the ordered n-tuple of actions
that S believes is requisite for performing a,, or
drinking orange juice. The agent could still be mis-
taken in his belief, but at least there must be some
semblance of sense to his belief.
Brand's definition of commitment can be modified
to avoid the criticism expressed above, that it commits
us to performing any action we wished we had performed,
by adding a time function. So revised (Ibl) would
read as (Ibla):
(Ibla) For every person S and every action a, and
every time t, S at t commits himself to per-
forming & iff
(1) there is an ordered n-tuple of auctions
rcx , Cp, c^ , . . .
,
c n y such that at t, S
performs each of the actions in
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<Ci» C 2 , cn). and S at t Justifiably
believes that this ordered n-tuple of
action is the requisite ordered n-tuple
of actions for performing
or
(il) there is an ordered n—tuple of actions
sCl> c 2-» c3 >•••» cn7 such that at t S
would perform each of the actions in
<cl» c 2» c3> • • • » c n/s' If he bad the oppor-
tunity to perform them, and at t S Justifiably
believes that this ordered n-tuple of
actions is the requisite ordered n-tuple
of actions for performing a.
Presumably, Brand's definition of "requisite action"
can be modified to serve as a definition of "requisite
ordered n-tuple of actions". So modified it would read
An ordered n-tuple of actions <C]_, c 2 , C3,..., c^
is requisite for S's performing a if and only if
under the given conditions, S is unable to perform
a. unless he performs <02 , c 2 , c^,..., c n> .
With these modifications in (ibl), Brand's theory
is capable of dealing with cases in which an agent
chooses at t to perform a. at t l
,
provided at t he is
willing to perform at t,'
,
if he has the opportunity,
all the actions he Justifiably believes are requisite
for performing a.
There is a further flaw in clause (il) of both
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(Ibl) and (ibla). For the sake of simplicity, let us
consider an action b, that is identical with the requisite
ordered n-tuple of actions for performing b. And let
us suppose that an agent justifiably believes that this
is the case. Suppose this agent is committed to per-
forming b at t;, but does not do so. Clause (i) would
then not apply.
On clause (ii) he is committed to performing b at
t_ if and only if he will do so if he has the opportunity
.
It is logically possible for him to have the oppor-
tunity to perform b at t and not believe that he has
the opportunity to do so, and, consequently
,
not even
try to do so. Thus we have a counterexample to all
versions of clause (ii) we have discussed.
To remedy this defect we must add a clause to (ii)
stipulating that the agent believe that he has the
opportunity to perform the action in question at the
time was to have had the opportunity to have dene so.
We noted above that on Brand’s definition of
commitment one is not committed if he has not yet per-
formed every action in the requisite ordered n-tuple
of actions, or if he's not such that he will do so if
he had the opportunity to do so and believes he has
the opportunity to do s o.
But how can one choose principles or general
actions? Suppose we have an agent, C, who has chosen
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to live a Christian life. By (lb) C has committed
himself to living a Christian life.
Now C is a very conscientious person. He Justi-
fiably believes that a certain ordered n-tuple of actions
is requisite for living a Christian life. This n-tuple
has as many member actions as C can perform up to his
death. But C is a conservative Christian who firmly
believes that one one has had a conversion experience
and has chosen to live a Christian life he is a Christian.
So long as he remains faithful he does not have to
make this choice again. So he believes this choice was
made once and for all, say, twenty years ago.
Button Brand's definition of commitment he has not
committed himself to living a Christian life until he
is Just about to die, for only then, on clause (i),
will he have completed the ordered n-tuple of actions
that he Justifiably believed was requisite for living
a Christian life. And since C had not committed himself
to living a Christian life before his last moments,
then, by (T13) he had not chosen to live a Christian
life until then.
Can we appeal to clause (ii) to cover a case like
C's? Remember, C is very conscientious . He has a
penchant for saying such things as, "Even our best is
not enough". So up until he was on his deathbed he
had not believed he had the opportunity to perform them.
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And only then 1 b he committed by clause (li) to living
a Christian life until he is on his deathbed.
Brand's theoiy will not allow the choosing of any
action of this type. A person who wants to choose to
live a moral life, to be a patriotic citizen, to be a
good husband, or to be a good father, will encounter
similar difficulties with this theory.
There are other difficulties with (lb) besides the
concept of commitment. Note that there is no time
reference in clauses (i) - (ill). He evidently relies
on the expression being defined, "S chose to perform
at t", to provide this reference. He says that choice
is terminal; it is not a process. But by clause (ii)
the agent's choosing to perform a is identical with his
performing x. And by (iii) his performing x is iden-
tical with his committing himself to perform a which
in turn by (ibl) is identical with a set of actions
he performs, or would perform if given the opportunity.
So performing x appears to be a process which would
make choosing a process. Brand might be able to avoid
this complication by eliminating the circularity in
(^bl ) due to clause (ill). Then a person has chosen
to perform a, if and only if he has satisfied certain
conditions
.
Clauses (iv) and (v) pose problems for their lack
of completeness. Brand apparently holds that the agent
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need not be able to specify the alternatives he believes
he has. But how can he consider them if he cannot
specify them? Clause (iv) is so vague that it does not
even include a reference to the action the agent is
choosing to perform. Without such a reference to a,
S might choose to perform a and not believe he is
capable of performing a. Brand must make (iv) more
explicit with regard to the alternatives the agent
believes he has.
In clause (v) Brand specifies that the agent
prefer a to the alternatives. But he does not refer
to any alternatives, yet S's preference is a two-place
asymmetrical relation that holds between two possible
courses of action. If the agent is going to prefer
to perform a to some other action, there must be some
other action that he can specify.
I might sa.y that at this moment I prefer to write
this paper rather than do anything else. If you ask
me what my options are, and I say that it does not
matter what they are, I prefer to just write this
paper, we would be justified in asking whether this
was a genuine choice situation for me.
Sometimes we do express our preferences in this
way. Then we usually do not even consider doing any-
thing else. Perhaps our attitude might be more accurately
termed desire rather than preference. But is this a
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genuine choice situation? In a choice situation we
do consider doing something else. And that something
else must be specifiable, and specified.
But is preference a necessary condition of choice?
We noted above that Glasgow insists that it is not.
Col lingwood outlines a type of choice, caprice, and
insists the preference is not a necessary condition.
So we must strike clause (v).
Brand's theory is plagued with problems, but it
has given us much food for thought about the conditions
of choice. We will pick up some of the loose ends in
this chapter and those of previous chapters in chapter 8.
Chapter 8
THE CONDITIONS OF CHOICE
We left some unfinished business in several chanters
concerning the conditions under which one chooses. At
several noints we have noted that the agent must believe
that he has alternatives if he is to choose. Only one
paper, Skinner f s, attemnted a statement of a criterion
for alternatives. We nointed out a defect in that cri-
terion in Chapter 5. Then we presented another criterion
with the note that we would re-cons ider it in Chapter 8.
W. D. Glasgow and P. H. Nowell-Smith engaged in a
debate over whether deliberation was a necessary condition
of choosing. We made reference to this debate in Chapters
4 and 6, but noted that a more complete treatment of the
role and nature of deliberation in choosing was needed.
In Chanter 2 we considered a theorv of choice that
cast choosing as nurnosive. None of the other theories
we examined, except for one of Collingwood f s
,
treated in
Chapter A, made even a passing reference to the role of
purpose in choosing.
Glasgow and Nowell-Smith debated the role of pref-
erence in choosing. Collingwood insisted that preference
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is not a necessary condition, while Brand insisted that
i^ is. A final statement on this is needed.
We devoted much suace in Charter 7 to a consideration
of Brand's concention of commitment. Glasgow and Nowell-
Smith also discussed commitment, but disagreed on its
role in choosing. We will consider each of these items
in turn in this chapter.
ALTERNATIVES
In Chapter 5 we cited, and criticised, a definition
of "alternative” that was advanced by Skinner. His def-
inition was:
Two or more courses of action are alternatives
when it is logically impossible for a person to
follow more than one of them at the same time.*
We noted that on this definition a logically imnos-
sible course of action could serve as an alternative.
At that time we also suggested this modification of the
definition.
(D-A2) Two or more courses of action are alternatives
for an agent if and only if it is physically
possible for him to carry out either one of
them, and he has the opportunity to carry out
4
*R. C. Skinner, "Freedom of Choice", P. 464.
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either one of them, and it is physically
impossible for him to follow more than one
oi* them at the same time.
Is ( D-A2 ) adequate? In our discussions in nre-
vious chapters we pointed out that as a condition of
choice, an agent only need believe that two specific
courses of action are alternatives for him. So (D-A2)
must spell out what an agent believes about these
courses of action.
But physical possibility £er s_e is still too broad.
Dr. Roger Bannister was the first person to run a mile
in less than four minutes. But one half hour before his
record-breaking run he was in his dressing room, an area
too small in which to run. He still had his street shoes
on his feet and was then incapable of running that fast.
Five minutes after his re cord -break 1" ns feat he did not
have the strength even to stand let alone run. If we add
a time function and stipulate that the ament must have
the capability as well as the opportunity and physical
possibility of pursuing each course of action, then we
will avoid some troublesome cases.
Sometimes when we are debating which course of action
to pursue another person will, in jest, suggest an additional
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course of action that is unrelated to the other possi-
bilities we are considering Our resrose is usually
to dismiss it as irrelevant. In order to be relevant
it must be a rival means of resolving the dilemma that
confronts the agent at that time. So (D-A2) can be
modified to (D-A3).
(D-A3) For any time t and any person S, two or
more rival courses of action are alter-
natives for S at t just when it is phys-
ically possible for S' to carry out either
one of them at t), and S has the capability
and the opportunity to carry out either
one of them at _t, and it is physically
impossible for S to carry out more than
one of them at j:.
Changes in the physical condition of the agent will
not produce troublesome cases for (D-A3). Changes in
the agent’s surroundings will also not provide grounds
for constructing undesirable cases.
The term "physically impossible" in the last con-
junct in (D-A3) could pose problems if we do not spell
out the courses of action sufficiently. For example,
if a host is serving three guests coffee, and there are
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four curs on the trey, "taking cun A” would not be an
alternative to "taking cun B", for agent S might not
find it physically imnossible for him to take both A
and B. Yet there is a tacit assumntion that no one will
take more than one so that each might have one. In this
situation, taking into account this tacit assumption,
courses of action that would be alternatives should be
specified as "taking just cup A" and "taking just cup B"
Then it would be physically impossible for S to take
just cup A and to take just cup B in this situation.
But what if the host holds out a tray of brownies?
Sunnose the tray is full. We would want to allow S to
consider "taking just brownie A" in this situation as
well. But he could also consider "taking just brownies
A and B" as an alternative. Careful and appropriate
specification of the courses of action in Question will
avoid problems with (D-A3).
DELIBERATION
Some of the theories we considered in earlier chap-
ters incorporated deliberation as a necessary condition
of choice. Others excluded it. The debate was the
strongest between W. D. Glasgow and P. H. Nowell-Smith,
with Glasgow holding that deliberation is an essential
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part of choosing.
Nowell-Smith argues that we do not always engage in
full scale deliberation before we choose. And he is right.
Sometimes there is very little time lag between the mo-
ment we start to deliberate and the moment when we choose
one of them. In those situations there is barely time to
deliberate. He writes.
choosing does not always involve deliberation or
even having reasons for one’s choice, apart from
having a simple nreference. Deciding, on the other
hand, is less hanpily divorced from deliberation.
A flipnant tyrant or bureacrat may decide a cause
off-hand; but we are concerned with ’resolve, make
up one’s mind’; and here there must surely be at
least some minimal deliberation (weighing up of
alternatives), not simple preference for one. 2
Remember that Nowell-Smith does not equate choosing
with deciding to do something but with doing-this-rather-




that deciding renuires at least minimal deliberation.
He writes
In order, therefore, for us to say that an act was
2 P. H. Nowell-Smith, ’’Choosing, Deciding and Doing”, P. 6i.
140
an act of choosing, there must be awareness of al-
ternatives as alternatives
, together with a con-
sidering of these alternatives. That is, there
must be at least minimal deliberation.
3
What would qualify as "a considering of these al-
ternatives"? Glasgow cites a situation as an example
of choosing without preference as part of his argument
against Nowell-Smith that preference is not essential to
choosing. The agent is "asked to choose a card from a
hand of cards held out to him (oresumably face down)".
He
. . . was aware that each card was a nossibilitv
of choice for him: he was free to take whichever
he wanted. But he also saw that each card was
exactly like its neighbour, and that there was
therefore no reason why he should take one rather
than another. He therefore made up his mind to




If the agent harrens to be very familiar wit h the
alternatives, merely identifying them, or recognizing
them, might suffice as minimal deliberation. Upon i-





dentifying them he could proceed to choose. In a situ-
ation in which he is not familiar with the alternatives
we might expect the agent to engage in more than minimal
deliberation. But must he? Sometimes we tell others
that they made a bad choice, snecifving or implying that
they should have considered their alternatives more
thoroughly.
Glasgow views minimal deliberation as an awareness
of the alternatives together with a considering of them.
But with the case of minimal consideration just cited,
awareness of the alternatives as alternatives seems to
be all that we need.
Often we find situations in which an agent is aware
of several possible courses of action as his alternatives
but he follows one course of action without seriously con
sidering any of the others. Are these cases instances
of choosing? If thev are, Glasgow must concede that
Nowell-Smith is correct, and that deliberation is not a
necessary condition of choice. "But the agent has made
up his mind without regard to the alternatives,” Glas-
gow could reply. The existence of alternatives had no
bearing on the course of action the agent followed. But
what bearing should they have? The agent was aware of
them as alternatives. As such he believed he could have
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followed any one of the other courses of action if he
had so chosen. And isn’t that minimal deliberation?
Gla sgow holds that choosing is deciding to follow
a particular course of action. And he stresses that com-
mitment is a necessary condition of choosing. But he
also insists that we must deliberate if we are to choose.
Has he confused ’’deciding to” with "deciding that”? He
could more easily argue that deliberation is a necessary
condition of "deciding thst”, for the object of ’’deciding
that” is a proposition. But the object of "deciding to”
is an action. We can safely agree with Nowell-Smith
that while we may deliberate in some cases of choosing,
we need not engage in full-blown deliberation in all
cases
.
But this move does not really resolve the difficulty.
The cases that would thus Qualify are ones in which the
agent in Quite familiar with the alternatives. He had
considered them, or options very similar to them, on
previous occasions. So his nuick identification of them
as ones he had previously considered, and his acting on
them without further deliberation, indicate that he is
relying on his previous deliberation to guide him.
Cases like these, however, will not suffice to es-
tablish Nowell-Smith’s position, for Glasgow can always
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appeal to the deliberation the agent had done previously,
and justify these cases on those grounds. Nowell-Smith
needs to make a more sophisticated attempt than this.
Let us consider the way an agent would deliberate
in a choice situation. His deliberation would ideally
follow essentially this nattern.
(1) I will realize E.
(2) A is a means of realizing E.
(3) B is a means of realizing E.
(4) A and B are alternatives for me.
(5) Shall I do A or shall I do B?
(6) I will do A.
This pattern of thinking wa s suggested to me by
Wilfrid Sellars’ work on -practical reasoning as outlined
in "Thought and Action". 5 Note that I did not call this
pattern of thought -practical reasoning. None of these
lines are conclusions drawn from -previous ones. And
remember that we are trying to set forth an unders tanding
of "consideration of alternatives", not a theory of prac-
tical reasoning.
To support my contention that (l)-(6) does not in-
volve any reasoning, let us look at each line. Line (1)
^Wilfrid Sellars, ’’Thought and Action”, in Keith Lehrer,





expresses an end or purpose; line? ( 2 ), ( 3 ) Rnd { u)
beliefs; line (5) a nuestion; and line ( 6 ) an intention.
There are no inference? drawn here.
Some might point out that the move from ( 5 ) to ( 6 )
is often accomplished by practical reasoning. That is
correct. Many instances of intentions expressed by sen-
tences such as line ( 6 ) are inferences drawn from reasoning
that follows the raising of a question such as expressed
by line (5). If an agent engaged in practical reasoning,
such reasoning would be likely to occur at that noint in
this nattern. But for choosing it is not necessary that
the agent engage in such reasoning.
Now a theory of practical reasoning should be pre-
pared to snell out the conditions under which one can
make such an inference. But this is not our concern
here. This paper is on choice, not practical reasoning.
And all we have to do is to spell out an understanding
of what it means to consider alternatives.
Line ( 6 ) expresses an intention. We noted diffi-
culties in ^ollingwood *s and Skinner’s theories in
moving from an intention to an action. A solution to
this problem is to utilize a distinction implicit in
Sellars* paper between a temporally indefinite occurrent
intention and a here and now occurrent intention.
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For Sellars, an intention is a shall-thought and is
expressed by a s hall-statement
. A shall-statement is a
practical assertion of the form:
such and such shall be the case.
The form of a here and now occurrent intention is
such and such shall now be the case.
Thus If line (6) expresses a temporally indefinite occur
rent intention, the corresponding here and now occurrent
intention would be expressed by
(7) I shall now do A.
Sellars notes that
There is an important similarity between learning
to make the language -entry transition of responding
to presented red objects by saying, "This is red,"'
and learning the language-departure transition,
which joins the saying of




I shall now do A
with a doing of A. Until a child has acouired this
connection, he has not learned the meaning of "I
shall now do A," and until he has learned this, he
cannot learn the full meaning of "shall", for all
other uses of "shall" owe their connection with
146
action to their connection with this use of ’’shall". 6
If S has an intention to do A in C and has the a-
bility and the opportunity to do so, and believes that he
is in C, then if he has no conflicting or coraneting in-
tentions, he will do A. This accounts for the connection
of intentions and actions. The connection between a here
and now occurrent intention and the appropriate behavior
is causal. The behavior is a response that is learned
when one learns the meaning of thoughts of the form
I will now do A
.
So, if a person has a succession of thoughts as
expressed by lines ( 1 ) — ( 6
)
and one as expressed by (7),
we would expect the appropriate behavior to follow. In
having these thoughts he would have been aware of the
alternatives as alternatives and wouldhsve considered
them in a minimal way. This pattern should satisfy
Glasgow’s condition of minimal deliberation.
However, Nowell-Smith insists that one need not de-
liberate at all. How can we accomodate this contention
with the view just outlined?
r
Aie view just outlined is idealized. Hut much of
our thinking is fragmentary. Even our theoretical
6 J.bld
. ,
Pp. 108-109. 1 disagree with Sellar's use of the
word 'shall' as opposed to 'will' in expressing intentions.
I will follow Collingwood and use 'will'.
14?
reasoning is frecuently fragmentary and enthymematic
.
From such a ^remiss as
Socrates is a man,
we readily infer
Socrates is mortal.
Obviously, the missing premiss is
All men are mortal.
As an argument it is an enthymeme.
Our thoughts might occasionally be a fragmentary
version of (l)-(7), such as
(1) I will realize E,
(4) A and B are alternatives for me.
(7) I will now do A.
But we might not even be conscious of a thought such as
that expressed by (1). There are many goals and purposes
which we have over long periods of time even though we
are not always thinking of them. And we sometimes act
to fulfill them without thinking about them.
Can we find a way to eliminate (4) and (7) and still
maintain that the agent is aware of his alternatives and
chooses intentionally? The answer is ’yes'.
We can anneal to what Q.uine has called the "transi-
tivity of conditioning. We noted above that one learns
to associate such thoughts as "I will now do A" with be-
7W
.










havior appropriate to doing A. Such behavior may be re-
garded as a conditioned response to such thoughts.
In a sufficiently sophisticated and conditioned agent
the thought "I will now do A" is apt to be skipped, and
what would otherwise prompt the thought, ”1 will now do
A” may prompt the behavior associated with the thought—
namely the performance of A. This is what is meant by
the transitivity of conditioning.
Now a person might be in a situation in which he i-
dentifies two ortions 8nd follows through on one of them,
without being aware of any thoughts to that effect. We
can justifiably claim that such a case is one of choosing
by appealling to the transitivity of conditioning and to
the enthymematic character of much of our thinking. Thus
we can take the pattern of deliberation outlined above as
our understanding of minimal deliberation in an ideal
choosing situation. Naturally we could engage in more
lengthy deliberation than that. Between the thoughts
expressed by lines (5) and (6) an agent could weigh the
consenuences of A versus B, the costs and the benefits
of A versus B, etc. He could engage in considerable
practical reasoning if he so desired. Thus, with the
qualification that the agent’s deliberat ion might be
enthymematic or might omit steps through transitivity
149
of conditioning, we conclude thst deliberation is a neces-
sary condition of choosing.
PURPOSE
The pattern of deliberation outlined above casts
choosing as purposive. There are two fundamental Questions
we must deal with in this section. First, is choosing
purposive? Second, can we choose our purposes? Most of
the theories we examined did not even mention purposes
behind choice.
We examined the concent of an alternative above.
And we noted that sometimes for a narticular course of
action, an agent might have the Physical nossibility,
canability, and onoortunity of performing it, and it
might be physically impossible for him to perform it and
some other courses of action at the same time, but that
he might reject it as an alternative because it is ir-
relevant to his concerns at the moment. It was on these
grounds that we introduced the term ’rival’ into (D-A3).
When one considers doing A or doing 3, what is it
that brings him to consider A and B together? Why does
he consider A and B instead of C and D? Or A and C?
There is a relationship between these alternative courses
of action that brings the agent to consider them at the
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same time as alternatives.
If another person suggests a possible course of action
for an agent to consider, and that agent rejects it, he
could do so because it is not relevant in the light of
his immediate and long range purposes, or it is not a
means to realize his goals.
Some might point out that it is an agent’s purposes
that determine which courses of action he will consider
as alternatives. But an agent will consider only those
courses of action that he believes are his alternatives.
And what factors affect his beliefs? Surely not some
standard of acceptability
,
such as would be based on his
feelings at the moment. Rather, he would believe that
action A is one of his alternatives at t only if he be-
lieved that A was a means of realizing purpose P which he
held at t.
The model of deliberation we advanced above was i-
dealized. Only one purpose was stated. But we usually
have several in mind explicitly or tacitly. Thus action
A may be a means of realizing purpose P; action B a means
to purpose Q,; action C a means to purpose R. And we
might see A, B, and C as our alternatives. But in
choosing we would appeal to a purpose higher than P, Q,
and R to resolve our dilemma. Thus the choice would then
be not between A, B, and C, but between P, Q, and R,
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and it would be made on the basis of realizing this higher
purpose
.
Another action, say D, might be advanced as another
possible course of a ction, but rejected because it is a
means of realizing only purpose S, one which is not de-
sired by that agent at that time.
It should be apparent by now that it is the hierarchy
of purposes and goals we have that provide the basis for
certain courses of action, or purposes, to be seen as al-
ternatives by an agent. The definition of alternatives
we advanced above, (D-A3), expresses the exclusion as-
pect of alternative courses of action, but does not bring
out the positive foundation of their relationship.
If two courses of action cannot be alternatives for
a given agent unless they are means of realizing one or
more of his purposes (and satisfy D-A3), then any courses
of action he sees as alternatives, he sees and considers
as means of realizing one or more purposes. The conse-
quence of this for choice is that choice must be purposive.
One cannot choose without considering alternatives. And
one considers alternatives only within the light of his
purposes. Thus choosing is purposive.
The second question we raised at the beginning of
this section was "Can we choose our purposes?" If all
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choosing is purposive, then, if we can choose purposes,
then there must be at least one purpose we cannot choose.
Such a purpose would be a supreme purpose or ultimate
purpose an agent's life. If we could choose it, then
there must be some other ourpose it serves as a means
of realizing, and it would then not be supreme. While
we cannot choose such a purpose, we can adopt it, or
acquire it in many other ways.
But what of our other purposes? Can we choose them?
In the deliberation model we proposed, choosing was cast
as purposive. The purpose was expressed in line (1) as
I will realize E,
But expressed in this form a purpose is itself an intention.
It might be a generalized intention if E was, say, my hap-
piness, If it is a temporally indefinite occurrent in-
i
tention, why couldn't there be a corresponding here and
now occurrect intention?
A problem arises at this point. If this purpose
is not a supreme purpose of this agent, he could choose
to adopt it. But what behavior would be appropriate for
such an intention? The thought is too general for one
to learn behavior appropriate to it on that model. And
yet if there is no behavior appropriate to that thought,
then it is not a here and now occurrent intention.
To be able to say that we can choose these purposes
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would require another model for deliberating and choosing.
On our model, the object of choice is a n action. The key
to understanding the model we have outlined is the behavior
we expect the agent to exhibit upon forming a here and now
occurrent intention. But if one forms an intention that
expresses a general purpose, what behavior can we exrect
him to exhibit?
Perhaps we can shed some light on this problem if we
consider conditional choices. Often persons choose to
peri orm c if ^ obtains. Thus at step (7) they would form
a conditional intention. What would qualify as behavior
appropriate to this intention? I suggest that it would
be that of reasoning in a certain way. He has the pre-
miss :
I will perform c if Q obtains.
When he is in a situation where he believes Q obtains,
he would then reason:
Q obtains.
So I will perform c here and now.
We now have a here and now occurrent intention that
would result in overt behavior according to our model.
If the intention one forms is general, such as in
the case of a principle or purpose, we could expect him
to engage in deliberation like
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Shall I realize P or shall I realize T?
I will realize Q. (choice of a purpose)
a is a means of realizing q,
b is a means of realizing Q.
Shall T do a or shall I do b?
I will do a
.
Thus the behavior we would expect him to exhibit in
choosing a purpose is that of reasoning in the way illus-
trated. Note that the first two lines in our illustration
are only the last two lines of the deliberation model we
set forth above. So, on the groundwork we have laid, it
is possible for a person to choose principles and to make
conditional choices as well as to choose to perform actions.
PREFERENCE
Nowell-Smith and Glasgow have another point of dis-
agreement that they deal with while they argue the de-
liberation point. Nowell-Smith insists that one need not
deliberate, but may merely nrefer one alternative to the
other. "Choosing does not always involve deliberation
or even having reasons for one’s choice, apart from having
a simple preference ."
H
^P. H. Nowell-Smith, "Choosing, Deciding and Doing”, P. 64.
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Glasgow disagrees, and a^ues that ^reference is
not a necessary condition of choice. He cites the card-
choice illustration we ouoted above as an instance of
choice without preference. To support Glasgow’s position
we could also appeal to a situation in which the agent
is confronted by two alternatives he likes equally, if
preference of the one chosen over the other is a require-
ment for choosing, then the agent cannot choose. He is
stalemated. Yet we do choose in situations like this.
The scales might be tinned in favor of the one he chooses
bv some factor such as proximity. Yet oroximity, like
nreference or any other sea le-tinniner factor, is not
necessary either.
The alternatives could be eoually preferable to the
agent and of eoual ease to carry out. But no stalemate
need result simply because the agent is not being pushed
toward one of the alternatives. The presence of these
factors would not constitute sufficient conditions for
choosing. One can prefer one of several alternatives
but choose none of them. ,/hat is needed is some form
of commitment to one of the alternatives, expressed in
the agent’s intention to adopt it. Bo we were justified
In agreeing with Glasgow «nd arguing against the in-
clusion of nreference as a necessarv condition of choice.
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COMMITMENT
In the last chapter we discussed at length Myles
Brand’s conception of commitment. We noted then that
his view was very narrow. Only cases in which the agent
had actually performed the action or would have performed
it if he had not been prevented from doing so would qual-
ify as cases of commitment for Brand. In addition to
beirer narrow and excluding all but cases of strong com-
mitment, Brand’s formulation can deal only with cases in
the nest. With his theory we are unable to say tte t this
agent is committed ri^ht now to rerforming action A at
some time
_t which is in the future.
Both Glasgow a nd Nowell-Smith speak of commitment,
and this is still another point at which they disagree.
Glasgow links commitment to deciding, whereas Nowell-
Smith ties it to choosing.
Glasgow does not incorporate any formal statement
of his conception of commitment in the text of either
of his papers mentioned earlier. The only reference to
commitment he makes in the bodies of his carers is to
say that while ”to choose” means ”to decide to do”,
choosing emnhasizes consideration of alternatives whereas
deciding emrhasizes commitment.
We do get a glimpse into his conception of commit-
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ment in a footnote where he writes
But when I decide to do something, then it could
be said that I am prepared to do it, and that I
will do it, if I can, when the time comes for me
to do it. This is what I mean by commitment.
Whether I tell anyone of my decision is irrele-
vant, although if I do announce it, it may be
more difficult for me to revoke it. As Nowell-
Smith saw, there are degrees of commitment. 12
Glasgow notes that there degrees of commitment.
And our everyday speech would support this observation
as we often say that a person is strongly committed. But
where in his statement of his understanding of commitment
is there room for variation in the strength of commitment?
Perhaps alternative interpretations of the clause "if I
can” might be one place we could make such adjustments.
If we were to try to insert an adverb before the verb
"prepared”, for example, "stronglv nrenared", would we
have solved the nroblem? This latter aprroach poses
additional difficulties. How does one determine that
another is "strongly pre oared" or "weakly prepared" to
perform an action?
The first suggestion appears to offer more fruitful
12Glasgow, "The Concept of Choosing", P. 65, note 2.
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possibilities. The clause "if I can" can be Interpreted
as loosely and weakly as "if it is convenient for me"or
"if I can fit it in". It can also be interpreted as
strongly as "if it is at all possible". The fundamental
difference between these interpretations would be em-
bodied in how much the agent was willing to do in order
to make it possible for him to perform that act which he
was committed to perform.
Are we justified in extending the meaning of "if
I can" this far? Glasgow does not mention taking steps
to make it possible for him to perform that action. The
only qualification that he states is "that I will do it,
if I can when the time comes for me to do it". Certainly
"if at all possible" is accentable as a strong reading of
"if I can". The agent would be giving highest nriority
to that particular action provided "possible" is not re-
stricted or qualified heavily. The difference in priority
assigned by the same agent to the performance of different
actions will then serve as an indicator of relative strength,
or weakness, or his commitment to perform each of the actions
in question.
Two different criteria are being debated here. One
will serve as the basis to determine whether the agent
is committed to nerforming a particular act. The quotation
we are considering from Glasgow is supposed to perform
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this function. The other will provide the means by which
we can obtain an approximate measure of the strength of
the agent's commitment to performing that act. Glasgow
acknowledges that there are degrees of commitment, but
does not provide us with the means to determine or to
measure them. As we have noted, the one criterion he
does suggest can be modified by nroviding annronriate
interpretations for the clause "if I can."
Glasgow indicates that Nowell
-Smith also saw that
there are decrees of commitment. The nassage he cites
is from Nowell -Smith 's "Choosing, Deciding and Doing".
I can commit myself or become committed in two
main ways. (a) I may have taken such steps as
to make a certain course of action inevitable or
more nearly inevitable than it was before. Thus,
if I have bought a train ticket and have no more
money, I am now committed to going by train and
not by bus ( if I go at all), (b) I commit (en-
gage) mvself when I promise to do something,
even, perhaps, when I announce my decision to do
it. But a private, unannounced decision does not
commit me to anything. If this account of com-
mitment is correct, it seems clear that when I
choose (embark on a course of action) I do, very
often, commit myself. I am to some extent com-
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mitted when I book a room at an hotel, to a less
extent when I announce to my family that I have
chosen the Metronole, but not committed at all
when I have merelv decided which hotel to so to. 13
That last clause in this passage clearly excludes
Glasgow’s conception of commitment from qualifying as
part of Nowell-Smith’s criteria. The exclusion of "mere
decisions" and the requirement that, at a minimum, an
announcement must be made, bear further examination. Who
or what would qualify as the one(s) to whom this annouce-
ment must be made? Must it be another human being?
If we insist that another human being be informed
of such decisions or promises in order for us to com-
mit ourselves, then a man such as Arthur Bremer was not
committed to killing George Wallace or Richard Nixon.
Bremer did shoot Wallace in Maryland. He followed him
around the country, and he trailed Nixon to Canada. At
one point he was so close to the President that he ap-
pears in one news photo with him. Bremer had told no
one of his decisions to kill Wallace and Nixon. Yet
even a casual reading of his diary will reveal that he
was very determined to do so. It dominated his thinkin
and shaped his travel itinerary. But whom did he tell?
13Nowell-Smith, Pp. 64-65.
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Can we consider his diary as his announcement of his
decisions? There was no communication. N 0 one heard him.
If we are to accept Bremer's case as an instance of com-
mitment on this criterion, then all one need do is to talk
to himself. No one else has to hear the announcement.
If Bremer's diary had not been found, no one would have
known of his announcement. But this is not an adequate
way to capture what Nowell
-Smith considers to be the
social character of commitment. For Bremer’s case, Glas-
gow’s concpetion of commitment is far more adeauate than
criterion (b).
Nowell-Smith has two criteria. Criterion (a) fares
no better than (b), for on (a), Bremer was not committed
to shooting Wallace until he squeezed the trigger. Only
then was it "more nearly inevitable (that he was going to
shoot Wallace) than it was before". All of his entries
in his diary and all of his travels across the country
in pursuit of Nixon and in pursuit of Wallace did not
make it inevitable, or more nearly inevitable, that
Bremer was going to shoot Nixon or Wallace. He might
have merely stood in the crowds and watched in Maryland,
as he had in Canada.
Criterion (a) is more negative in its accroach than
(b). The sense of "committed to cerform" for (a) is clo-
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ser to "had no choice but to nerform" whereas the sense
of "committed to perform” for (b) is closer to "deter-
mined to perform". Criterion (a) carries with it not
merely the closing off of other courses of action, but
of leaving the agent no choice but to perform that par-
ticular action. Criterion (a) expresses strong commit-
ment but in a way in which the agent appears to be
backing into the situation. Brand’s criterion is a
more positive expression of strong commitment.
What is the fundamental sense of ”S is committed
to performing action A"? is it "S is determined to
perform action A”? Is it ”S is prepared to perform
action A”? Neither Nowell-Smith nor Glasgow seek to
delineate a fundamental sense of the concept of com-
mitment that will serve as a unifier through the vari-
ations in the criteria needed to capture the different
degrees of commitment. Glasgow does not encounter this
problem directly, for though he acknov/ledges that there
are degrees of commitment, he advances only one cri-
terion. But Nowell-Smith advanced two.
Nowell-Smith states in a footnote that he has worked
out the relationship between (a) and (b) in Chapter 14-
in his book Ethics. In that charter he focusses his
attention on obligation and its role in the determination
of the course of action of an agent. But the connection
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between that discussion and the criteria of commitment
we have been considering is not apparent. Nowell-Smith
states explicitly that when a person is obliged to do
something he would rather not do it. "A moral obligation
is, like a natural obligation, something which obliges
me to act in a way that, but for the obligation, I
would not have acted. ,tlZ4>
In moral, as in the other cases, the logic of
obligation requires a conflict between the obli-
gation to do something and the inclination not
to do it. But it is important to notice that
this conflict is part of the general background
of obligation and need not occur in every case. 15
These two passages show that the concept of obli-
gation, as portrayed by Nowell-Smith, will not serve as
the foundation for linking (a) and (b), though he states
that it will. In criterion (b) there is no conflict be-
tween an agent’s committing himself to performing an
action by deciding, or promising, to do it and his de-
sire, or inclination, to do It. Sometimes we can ex-
tricate a -promise from another when he is not inclined
to perform that action, but it is these cases that are
^P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics
.
( Baltimore : Penguin Books,
Inc., 1954), P. 210.
15 Ibid., Pp. 210-211.
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the exceptions rather than the rule. Normally there is
little conflict.
We have been interpreting (a) in a negative manner.
Nowell-Smith might object, for if one takes such steps
as to make a course of action inevitable, or more nearly
inevitable, hasn’t he done so intentionally? Yes. But
if I am committed to nerforming action A, I would take
steps to make it possible for me to nerform action A.
I would take such steps that would be necessary for me
to perform action A. Now criterion (a) states sufficient
conditions for me to be committed ti performing action A,
but it is not necessary that (a) be that strong if I am
also the one to perform the action in question.
Suppose I am committed to having another person per-
form action A. Then (a) would be more acceptable. I
would want, at a minimum, to have S promise to perform
action A. But if I were strongly committed to having S
perform action A, I would take such stens as necessary
to make it inevitable. Note that while we have been con-
sidering commitment only in the context of "I commit
myself to performing action A", this interpretation of
criterion (a) is permissible because Nowell-Smith is
presenting criteria for ”1 can commit myself or become
committed. . . ." Even in criterion (b) when the agent
is the same one who will perform that action, Nowell-
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Smith still does not specify that to which the agent com-
mits himself.
We are not concerned here with the concept of com-
mitment j>er se, but with commitment as it is related to
choice. Brand specifically places this nualifi cation on
his definition. Can one choose to have another person
perform a particular action? An army captain might
choose to have his men charge a certain bunker, or a
judge might choose to have the defendant serve one year
in prison. But both of these cases can be rephrased so
that the captain chooses to attack the bunker and the
judge chooses to sentence the defendant to one year in
prison. I believe that all other cases can be similarly
rephrased
. If they can be, then (a) is needlessly strong.
If one is strongly committed to performing a parti-
cular action, then he will perform it if he has the op-
portunity to do so. The strength of his commitment
could be measured by what he is willing to do to bring
about this opportunity. Thus we could modify (a) to (a»).
(a») For any person S, any action a, S is stongly
committed to performing a if and only if
(1) S performs a if he has the opportunity
to perform a, and
(2) S takes steps to bring about the op-
portunity to perform a.
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The difficulty with criteria for measuring strong
commitment is that as we add conditions to guage strength,
we shift the locus of the measurement problem rather than
solve it. Condition (2) specifies that "S takes steps.
.
Do we mean that S takes every step that is necessary to
bring about this opportunity? What if S takes every
necessary step but one? What if he takes every reasonable
step but one? What if he takes every step we could rea-
sonably expect him to take? If we modify the criterion
in this way, we need a supplementary definition for
"reasonable". A gain we have not solved the problem, but
merely moved its locus.
In our discussion of criteria (a) and (b) we have
taken Nowell-Smith 1 s word that they represent different
degrees of commitment. He insists that one is less com-
mitted when he has made and announced a decision, or
made a promise, than when he has taken such steps as to
make a certain course of action inevitable. But what if
agent S announces his decision to perform action A, and
then takes such steps as to make his performance of A
Inevitable? On Nowell -Smith’s view the agent’s commit-
ment to performing A increases in strength from the point
at which he made his announcement to the point at which
he has taken such steps as to make his performance of A
inevitable. However, agent S might object and point out
i6y
that his commitment to performing A was just as strong
when he announced his decision to perform A as it was
after he had taken those steps. He could maintain that
it was because he was so committed to performing A that
he took those steps to make his performance of A inevi-
table.
Nowell-Smith anrarently bases his contention that
the agent’s commitment is treater after he has taken
those stern than before on the decrease in options a-
veilable to the agent and the increased probability
that the agent will be unable to change his mind or
break his promise. The agent, on the other hand, is
appealling to his intention to perform A, which remains
the same from his announcement of his decision to per-
form A, through the steps he takes to make it inevitable,
to hisperf ormance of a. How do we adjudicate between
these different approaches?
It should be apparent by now that there are two dif-
ferent tyres of criteria for commitment that are being
advanced. And the distinction of strong/weak can be
applied to both tyres. The tyre advanced by Brand and
by Mowell-^>mith in (a) is based on conditions external
to the agent. We noted that Brand’s is very narrow, even
to the point of denying that one is committed if he has




-Smith’s is slightly looser. But the
general sense of this type of commitment is that of con-
straint.
The other type is based on the agent’s intention to
perform the action. It is more difficult to measure ac-
curately. The general sense of this type of commitment
is that of determination. As we noted above, it is dos-
sible to be strongly committed in one sense and weakly
committed in the other sense. Both senses are imnortant
and relevant for choosing.
The intentional type of commitment can be either
specific or general in its relation to actions. 0ne
may be committed to performing a specific action in that
he has formed a conditional intention, such as
\
I will do A if W obtains.
Or, he may have formed an intention such as
I will do A at time t,
where t is some time in the future.
When one’s commitment is general, there is no specific
action that is the object of the Intention. In our delib-
ation model, each of the agent's alternatives is seen as
a means of realizing another more general puruose, When
we find a general intention that does not serve as a means
of realizing another purpose, we have an instance of the
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supreme general purposes we spoke about above.
The two types of commitment, the intentional and the
non- intentional
,
both function in choosing. When one is
deliberating, and has formed his intention to perform a
certain action, but has not yet formed the here and now
occurrent intention to do so, he is committed intentionally.
As he carries out his intent in action, he becomes committed
in the non-intentional sense as well. This is particularly
apparent when he must perform some preliminary activity
in order to perform that action which he has chosen*
It is important for us to note, however, that without
the intentional type of commitment, the agent cannot be
said to have chose. The behavior he exhibits may show
non-intentional commitment and yet be unintentional. On
our view of intention, commitment, and deliberation, an
agent cannot unintentionally choose to do somethin.
At many points in this chapter we have given more
than intimations of the shape of the theory of choice to
be presented in the next chapter. Indeed, this chapter
was intended to straighten out some of the difficulties
concerning the conditions of choice, and thus pave the
way for that theory. It is now time to lay out that
theory in full.
Chapter 9
THE CONCEPT OF CHOICE—A PROPOSAL
In our analysis of other theories, it became appar-
ent that choosing to perform A is related in some sense
to the perfomance of A. The problem is specifying pre-
cisely the relationship between choosing to perform A
and oerforming A. Some theories we examined cast choo-
sing as an action. One version cast "choosing to -per-
form A" as "performing A-rather-than-B"
. Another cast
choosing to perform A as an action that, once we wended
our way through the comnlexities of the theory, turned
out to be the very action that was chosen. The problems
we encountered with these theories were of the type
dealt with in the previous chapter.
Another tack was to portray choosing to perform A
as deciding to perform A under various conditions. The
difficulty with this approach was that the choosing was
incomplete until the action chosen was actually nerformed.
Nowell-Smith recognized this problem and cast choosing
as basically an action, but advanced a derivative formu-
lation for choices made regarding actions to be performed
in the future.
Nowell-Smith, Evans and Glasgow debated about the
standard sense of "choose". Each pointed to conditions
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that he considered necessary for choosing and indicated
variants which incorporated additional conditions. We
are not going to try to argue for a standard sense of
choosing”. Rather, we will avoid this debate by out-
lining an idealized model for choosing and show that many
of our choosings are but fragmentary versions of that
model. We will show that viable theories previously
examined will fit this model in some way.
In chapter 8 we outlined our view of the relation
between thought and action. We learn the meaning of
”S chooses to perform A now” by associating thoughts
like this with the appropriate behavior. We understand
other types of choosing (condition choice, choice of
principles, etc.) in the light of our initial under-
standing of "S chooses to perform A now.
So we will outline a theory for ”S chooses to per-
form A at t” where the choosing and performing both take
place at jt
,
and we will indicate the ad.iustments to be
made for other cases.
First, we will give our model for deliberation in
a choosing situation.
(D14) In any choosing situation, for any agent S,
any purpose P of S's, S deliberates about
how to realize P if and only if
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(a) S»s thoughts follow this pattern:
(1) I will realize P.
(2) A is a means of realizing P.
(3) B is a means of realizing P.
(lv ) A and B are alternatives for me.
(5) Shall I nerform A or shall I
perform B?
(6) I will nerform A.
or
(b) S f s thoughts are enthymematically re-
lated in form to (a).
In Chapter 8 we pointed out how our theoretical rea-
soning is often enthymemat ic
.
And we stated that a suf-
ficiently sophisticated agent is ant to omit many of the
stems in the model we nresented then, which is the same
as that nresented in (a) above. These omissions are ex-
plained by the transitivity of conditioning, ana these
cases are thus iustifiably considered as instances of
deliberation on this model.
The same is true of deliberation. This, too, is
commonly fragmentary. We may not even have a clearly
conceived and specifiable purpose. Some might object
that such cas^s are simply not in accord with our model.
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But this objection is not decisive, since we can under-
stand and justify the fragmentary cases only be treating
them as if more of the idealized nattern were there. Thus,
if we ask a person to spell out more completely what he
did and why, he would give us an account that would be
recognizable as at least a fragment of this idealized
model
.
We should note that on (DU) there is no inference
drawn. None of the lines need be conclusions drawn from
previous lines. Thus, while choosing on our model is
purposive, it can be capricious. A person could engage
in practical reasoning between lines ( 5 ) and ( 6 ), but
need not do so, even to follow this idealized model.
The theory of choice that emerges from our examination
of this concept we will label (TU).
(TU) For any person S, any action A, any time t,
where t is now or in the past, S chooses to
perform A at t if and only if there is a P
such that
:
(1) At t P is a purpose of S’s,
(2) At t S deliberates about how to realize P,
and
(3) (a) As a result of his deliberating about
how to realize P, S forms the intention
at t
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I will now perform A
find S exhibits the behavior appropriate
to this intention if he is capable,
or
(b) By virtue of the transitivitv of con-
ditioning, S proceeds at t directly
from deliberating to exhibiting behavior
appropriate to the intention
I will now perform A.
As we have noted, sometimes we choose now to perform
an action some time in the future. But (T1A) will not
suffice for these cases. So we need a statement of (T14)
sufficiently qualified to enable us to consider these
instances as cases of choosing.
(T14a) For any person S, any action A, any time t,
and any time t' after t, S chooses at t to
perform A at t* if and only if there is a
P such that
:
(1) At t t P is a purpose of S f s,
(2) At t, S deliberates about how to
realize P,
(3) As a result of his deliberating about
how to realize P, S forms the intention at £
I will do A at t»
.
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If t' has not yet occurred, we cannot expect S to
have exhibited behavior appropriate to this intention.
If S does not chance his mind between t and
_t*, then we
expect him to behave in this way;
( a ) at jt f
,
S reasons
It is now t/
,
I will now do A,
and S exhibits the appropriate behavior if he
is capable,
or
(b) at t 1
,
S exhibits behavior appropriate to the
intention
I will now do A.
We will need to employ ( D1A) for (T14a) as well as
fcr (TU). (TUa) will do for those cases of choosing
when the action chosen is to be Performed at some time
after it is chosen, and for those cases of choosing
where the performance of the action is conditional upon
the realization of a particular state of affairs. Some-
times we make statements or have thoughts of the form
I will do B if R obtains.
Now R might never obtain. But this type of intending is
allowable as an instance of choosing under (T14&), pro-
vided the other conditions are fulfilled, for time t'
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can then be understood as that time when the state of
affairs R obtains.
We can use (T14) for cases where a person chooses
to adopt a purpose. Two changes must be made in (D14)
to cover these cases. First, line (5) should read
(5') Shall I adopt A or shall I adopt B?
Second, line (6) should read:
(6*) I will adopt A.
Similar modifications must be made in (3a) and (3b) of
(T14), keeping in mind that in the definiendum A is now
to be considered a nurpose, and that S is choosing to
adopt A.
The behavior aporooriate to an intention such as
I will now adopt purpose P
is reasoning in patterns similar to that advanced in
(D14).
(T14) includes the provision for the agent's belief
that he has specific alternatives. These alternatives
are directly related to the agent's intentions, and ir-
relevant possible actions are thereby excluded as al-
ternatives. Thus (T14) is not subject to problems we
encountered in Chanter 3 with Evans' theory were any
object would qualify as an alternative, whether the a-
gent believed it was one of his alternatives or not.
177
This theory provides for the agent’s deliberation
and his intentional performance of the action chosen,
or for other appropriate behavior if the object of choice
l
is not an action. And his performance of this action is
a direct result of his deliberation. Theories which
based choosing on taking an object fell prey to the ob-
jection that a person could unintentionally or accidentally
take one from among several objects he believed were his
alternatives and thereby choose it. If the object of
choice is an object, one can choose it, on the basis of
(T14), by choosing to take it. Theories which based
choosing on deciding failed to snell out what behavior
we could expect from the one who had chosen and what re-
lationship obtained between the choosing and the appro-
priate behavior. (T14) avoids all these problems.
With built-in adjustments for conditional and "cold-
storage” choices, this theory avoids difficulties encoun-
tered by theories which require that the appropriate be-
havior expected from an agent be an action, such as
taking an object. These adjustments also raved the way
for us to srell out how we can choose purposes.
(T14) casts choosing as purposive. Some might ob-
ject and point to Collingwood ’ s theory considered in




And to choose capriciously does not mean to choose without
regard to a purpose. It means that the choosing is not
the result of practical reasoning. ( T1A) enables one to
choose capriciously or to choose as a result of his prac-
tical reasoning. So this theory avoids the pitfalls of
the other theories examined, ard includes the provisions
we have found to be necessary.
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